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ABSTRACT
United States Mediation in the Post Cold-War Era: Three Case Studies
By
Tuba Kesim
A thesis presented for the Degree of Master of International Relations 
Bilkent University, November 1997
This study aims to compare and contrast the United States’ mediation attempts in 
the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli and Haitian conflicts. For this purpose, 
the following components of the literature on mediation are utilised as the analytical 
tools of this thesis: The power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles played 
by the mediator, entry and timing of the mediator. In addition, certain indicators are 
chosen; namely, the relative power of the parties, redistribution of resources, policy 
or position changes, duration of the conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms, 
the use of media in order to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of 
the mediation attempts. According to the analyses of these three mediation attempts, 
this thesis reveals that “mediation” stands as an important foreign policy making 
tool of the United States in the Post Cold-War era. In addition, this study 
underscores the importance of mediator’s power in international mediation attempts.
Ill
Lastly, the study intends to make a contribution to the literature on mediation 
through defining a new concept called indirect mediation.
Key words: International Mediation - The United States Mediation Attempts - 
Bosnian Conflict - Palestinian and Israeli Conflict - Haitian Conflict.
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ÖZET
Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arabuluculuğu Girişimleri:
Üç Vaka Çalışması
Tuba Kesim
Bilkent Üniversitesi, Kasım 1997
Bu tezin amacı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Bosna ihtilafı, Filistin-İsrail ihtilafı 
ve Haiti ihtilafı üzerine yürüttüğü arabuluculuk girişimlerini karşılaştırmaktır. Bu 
analizi yapmak için, arabuluculuk literatürünün aşağıda belirtilen önemli bileşenleri 
değerlendirilmiştir: Arabulucunun gücü, arabulucunun çıkarları, arabulucunun 
üstlendiği roller, arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş tarzı ve arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş 
zamanı. Buna ek olarak, tarafların birbirlerine göre değerlendirilen güçleri, 
kaynakların tekrar bölüşümü, politika ya da tutum. değişiklikleri, ihtilafın süresi, 
ihtilafın şiddetlenip şiddetlenmediği, süregelen mekanizmaların kurulması, 
medyanın kullanımı gibi göstergeler, arabuluculuk girişiminin getirdiği değişimleri 
incelemek amacıyla seçilmiştir. Bu üç arabuluculuk girişiminin analizi sonucunda, 
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin dış politika oluşturma araçları arasında 
arabuluculuğun önemli bir yeri olduğu gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, 
arabulucunun gücünün arabuluculuk girişimlerindeki öneminin altını çizmektedir. 
Son olarak, bu çalışma, “dolaylı arabuluculuk” adında yeni bir kavram tanımlayarak 
arabuluculuk literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk - Amerika Birleşik Devletleri 
Arabuluculuğu - Bosna İhtilafı - Filistin ve İsrail İhtilafı - Haiti İhtilafı.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to compare and contrast three international mediation 
attempts conducted by the United States (US) during the post cold war era. These 
cases, namely the US mediation attempts in the Bosnian conflict, the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, are analysed in accordance with the 
framework borrowed from the literature on international mediation.
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Conflict has been an integral part of human lives and likewise of international 
relations. There are several ways to deal with conflict peacefully. Negotiation, 
arbitration, preventive diplomacy and mediation are major mechanisms used for 
peaceful resolution of disputes. The focus of this study is the process and outcome 
of international mediation.
International mediation can be seen as a nonbinding process of 
peacemaking, involving the intervention of a third party, aiming to resolve or at 
least de-escalate a conflict among parties.
International mediation, in practice, has a long history. However, the same 
can not be claimed for its systematic study. Only for the last thirty years, students of 
the field have been studying the dynamics of international mediation. Young,' 
Burton and Stenelo's studies are the pioneers of the field.
In the literature, there are various definitions of international mediation, 
ranging from general to detailed. Doob’s definition can be shown as an example for 
a general one. He sees mediation as “the efforts of one or more persons to affect one 
or more other persons when ...the former, the latter or both perceive the problem 
requiring a solution.”"*
Like Doob's definition, there are definitions stressing the objectives of a 
mediation attempt, such as necessity of achieving a solution or an agreement in the 
end. For example, Dryzek and Hunter define mediation as “a process in which the 
parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually agreed solution under the aegis of a 
third party by reasoning through their differences”.^  Along the same line, Stenelo, 
while underlining the changeable character of mediation, defines it “as the process 
initiated by a third party in his attempts to facilitate the solution of other parties’ 
disagreements in order to ensure the achievement of a negotiated settlement”.^  On 
the other hand, there are scholars like Mitchell who widen the range of mediation 
objectives and, therefore stressing the fact that mediation is not static, but dynamic. 
He defines mediation as “any intermediary activity...undertaken by a third party 
with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at 
stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour”.^  Touval 
and Zartman’s definition, despite being a broader one, is also along these lines:
“Mediation is a form of third party intervention in conflict for the purpose of 
abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation.”*
In the literature, there are also definitions which focus on the characteristics 
of the third party- the mediator. For example, Bingham, sees mediation as the 
“assistance of a neutral party to a negotiation”  ^and Moore, defines it as
the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, 
impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative 
decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily 
reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in
dispute. 10
One of the broadest definitions in the literature is Bercovitch and Houston’s. 
Underscoring the dynamic nature of the international mediation, in which “a 
reciprocal relationship” '' between the mediator and the parties exists they define it 
as,
a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek 
the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, 
group or organisation to change their behaviour, settle their 
conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical 
force or invoking the authority of law.
An indispensable factor in a mediation, is certainly the mediator who may be 
an individual, a state or an institution or organisation.'^ The students of mediation
analysed different aspects of the role of and the process of mediation. Issues such as 
the stakes of the mediator, role/strategies of the mediator, power/resources of the 
mediator, timing of the mediator and the entry of the mediator are important 
components of the literature on mediation.
1.1.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
A mediator’s ability to make an impact on a dispute, which can be called leverage, 
is linked with its power thus its resources, such as, money, status, expertise, access 
and prestige.A s Carnevale and Pruitt put it, a mediator’s power sometimes stems 
from its reputation and authority and sometimes from the capacity to reward and 
punish the disputants.'^ The previous accomplishments of the mediator, its 
economic, military and political power in the international arena are important 
sources of power which may enable the mediator achieve its objectives.
Contrary to some scholars, such as Bercovitch , Touval and Zartman , who 
stress the importance of leverage for an effective mediation, there are some scholars 
who remind that the lack of political power of a mediator might facilitate success as 
her/his credibility and sincerity may be enhanced.'* In addition, ■S'/Zw'^  argues that 
the non-threatening stance of small states lead to their acceptability as mediators.
The scholars seem to have consensus over the idea that the overuse of 
leverage or exerting power frequently in a mediation attempt carries risks. For 
instance, Rubin^^ claims that a third party should not exert its full power in small 
scooped conflicts because a settlement achieved under strong pressure from the 
mediator may not endure. Likewise, the extreme use of carrots (like rewards.
incentives) and sticks (like punishments, ultimatums or withholding carrots) as the 
conceptual components of leverage, may not produce any positive outcome. 
Touval and Zartman stress that “a too strenuous use of sticks can cause a party to 
withdraw its acceptanee of mediation, and leave the mediator without a role”.^  ^
Besides, an overuse of carrots may result in a situation in which the concessions are 
only achieved through these rewards.
1.1.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
In the literature, there are different views about stakes of the mediator. Some 
scholars, like Davis and Dungan^^, Moore^^ moving along the traditional line, do 
not consider the mediators’ having a stake in the outcome of the process. On the 
other hand, some scholars like, Touval and Zartman^\ Bailey^^, Kleiboer^^ do not 
regard the mediators’ that altruistic but interest-oriented as well. For example, 
Touval and Zartman have labelled two kinds of motives a mediator may have at 
stake: Defensive and expansionist motives. Defensive motives may arise when a 
dispute threatens the interests of the mediator and expansionist motives may emerge 
if the mediator has a desire to extend and increase its influence, resources and
power 28
In a more detailed manner, Bercovitch lists five types of motives that a 
mediator may pursue. Like Touval and Zartman’s distinction, he mentions the 
motive stemming from a negatively affected interest due to a conflict and the motive 
arising from an aim to extend its influence over the parties. The other three may 
arise from a mandate, like the constitutions of the Organisation of American States;
from the demand o f one or both o f the parties and from a desire to keep a structure
to which they belong intact.29
1.1.3 ROLES/STRATEGIES OF THE MEDIATOR
In the literature, typologies of mediator roles/strategies by Kressel and Touval and 
Zartman are well-known. Kressel developed three kinds of strategies ranging from 
passive to active as follows; Reflective behaviour, nondirective behaviour and 
directive behaviour. The reflective behaviour can be accepted as the preliminary 
activities on which the mediator builds its later work. It involves discovering issues 
and facilitating better interactions.The purpose is to reduce the degree of 
complexity and uncertainty inherent in any international conflict.^* Nondirective 
behaviour is a more active category and aims to produce a favourable climate for 
mediation with the contribution of the mediator. Directive behaviour, implies a 
mediator aiming to manipulate the parties toward a specific settlement.
By the same token, Touval and Zartman classified mediation behaviour 
along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention, but with different 
labels: Mediator as a facilitator within which communicator and formulator roles 
are present and mediator as a manipulator. The most passive role is facilitator 
which is usually acquired when communication between the parties is broken.
Within the range of passive facilitator and active formulator, the mediator 
may serve as a channel of communication, carry proposals of concessions thus 
become a communicator as the parties can not contact each other directly. A more 
active role is formulator by which the mediator may “redefine the issues in conflict
or find a formula for the conflict’s resolution or managemenf’.^ '* Therefore it may 
submit proposals in an effort to persuade the parties to conflict.^^ As Touval and 
Zartman state, mediator along this role works on perceptions, doing nothing to
change the nature of the problem.36
Mediator as a formulator may also determine the mediation place, the
7number and type of meetings with the disputants. Moreover, it may help in 
providing a neutral environment, deciding on who will participate in the
q  Q
negotiations and in controlling outside pressure.
The most active role is manipulator in which a mediator uses its leverage,
o  0
resources of power, influence and persuasion to move the parties into agreement. 
Mediator as a manipulator changes the structure of the conflict'*® by empowering 
the weaker side of the conflict through using carrots and sticks. In conflict cases 
where there is significant power asymmetries between the parties, the mediator may 
make a deliberate effort to enhance the power of the weaker party in order to 
decrease power discrepancies between the parties. In an effort to prevent the 
stronger party “to impose an unsatisfactory settlement on another” the mediator may 
assist the weaker party.'*' The idea here is to create a conducive environment for the 
resolution of the conflict.
In the mediation literature, there are other roles listed by other scholars as 
well. For example, Rubin lists a number of roles such as formal as opposed to 
informal roles, individual in contrast to representative role, invited to non-invited 
role, advisory to directive roles, content to process roles, permanent to temporary
roles and conflict resolution to conflict prevention roles. Moreover, Rubin 
numerates three functions for a mediator: Modification of physical and social 
structure within which the conflict is waged, modification of issue structure and 
increasing the motivation of the parties to reach agreement.'*  ^Moore enumerates a 
number of roles and functions that a mediator may acquire, such as opener of 
communications channels, legitimiser, process facilitator, trainer, resource 
expander, problem explorer, agent of reality, scapegoat and leader."*^  Though in 
much the same vein, Stulberg’s list of mediator’s roles is a little narrower: Catalyst, 
educator, translator, resource expander, bearer of bad news, agent of reality and 
scapegoat.'*'’ The variety of roles, strategies and functions of a mediator show the 
diversity of international mediation and stress the importance of analysing each case 
within its uniqueness.
In the mediation literature, the concepts of impartiality and neutrality of a 
mediator have received significant attention by scholars of the field. The definitions 
on impartiality seem to stress the unbiased nature of a mediator.'*  ^ According to 
Moore, impartiality refers to an unbiased opinion or lack of preference in favour of 
one or more parties in conflict.'*  ^ Therefore a partial mediator can be regarded as 
closer to one side than the other, politically, economically, culturally.'*^
On the other hand, neutrality refers to pursuing no personal preferences that 
the dispute be resolved in one way or another.'** Carnevale and Arad regard the 
neutrality of a mediator as having no opinion about the conflict.'*^
Contrary to these views, Bercovitch rules out the possibility of a neutral 
mediator on the grounds that the mediators’ entry changes the structure and setting 
of the dispute by turning a dyad into a triad. Besides, he also shows mediators’ own 
interests to intervene as a reason to exclude the possibility of a neutral mediator. In 
addition, Bercovitch also stresses that “depending on their conduct and perceived 
qualities of outcome”, a mediator may be partial or impartial but can not be 
neutral.^®
In the literature of international mediation there is a heated dispute 
concerning whether or not the impartiality is a must for effective mediation. Some 
scholars following the traditional line consider mediator impartiality as a critical 
quality for successful mediation.^' On the other hand, some scholars like Faure,^^ 
Kressel and Pruitt^^ Smith '^  ^ Touval and Zartman^^ do not consider impartiality a 
necessary condition for a mediator. Furthermore, some analysts view impartiality as 
an exception.^*  ^ Bercovitch and Houston stress the mediators’ ability to influence, 
protect, or extend the interests of each party in conflict as the reason for their 
acceptability, not their impartiality.^^ For example, the mediator might favour the 
weaker party, in other words empower the weaker party, in order to force the more
powerful disputant to come to the negotiation table.58
1.1.4 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
Several motives may lead the disputing parties to become willing to seek or accept 
mediation. Some political interests of the parties like seeking a certain mediator so 
as to achieve a favourable agreement over the adversary, aiming to guarantee an 
eventual agreement with the inclusion of a third party, trying to improve its relations
with the mediator or accepting a mediator as a face-saving device to protect their 
domestic and international reputation can be cited among these motives.
The entry of a mediator can be realised in two ways. The mediator might be 
either invited by the disputants, or imposed by its own initiative. It will obviously be 
for the benefit of the resolution of the conflict if the mediator is invited by the 
disputants since this invitation can be regarded as a sign to work on the problem by 
peaceful means. By this way the third party occupies a unique position to exercise 
influence.*’*^ Concerning the imposed way of entrance, Rubin underlines the 
importance of the disputants’ perception of the third party’s initiative.
1.1.5 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
Timing can be regarded as crucial in a mediation attempt. As stressed by 
Bercovitch,^^ the duration of a dispute and the timing of initiating mediation may to 
a large extent determine the likelihood of its success.
Scholars of the field to a large extent agree that a mediator should intervene 
in a conflict when the timing is “ripe”. However, there are different views 
concerning the timing of this ripeness. Edmead favours the realisation of the 
mediation attempt at an early stage, “before the adversaries cross a threshold of 
violence and begin to inflict heavy losses on each other”.^  ^ On the other hand, 
scholars like Northedge and Donelan, Frei, Koh, stress that timing of the mediation 
should match the signs of willingness to ease the positions of the parties and 
therefore favour a late entry.^  ^ Bercovitch, on the other hand, claims the dispute
10
becomes ripe for mediation at around seven to thirty-six months, at a stage when the 
adversaries presumably exhausted other modes.
Zartman, takes into account certain events while deciding for the ripe time 
to intervene and enumerates three conditions to decide:
1. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate;
2. The efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions should be 
blocked and bilateral solutions should become conceivable
3. The power reUuions between the adversaries should be changed in such a 
way that a party which previously had the upper hand in the conflict starts 
slipping and the underdog starts running.
1.1.6 CHANGES REALISED
The entry of a mediator may cause some changes in the conflict system:
The mediator may increase, decrease or may not affect the relative power 
of the parties. In this manner, it may change the power balance between the parties 
by providing or not providing certain resources, such as financial capital, arms and 
recognition.
As an outcome of the mediation, resources may be redistributed between 
the parties or the mediator may provide resources in an effort to achieve certain 
changes during the mediation process. For example, territory and power may be
11
redistributed between the parties. The mediator may offer financial capital or its 
support in an international organisation to the disputants.
Another change may be realised in the policies or the positions of the 
parties during or as a result of the mediation attempt. The parties may give up their 
previous policies or positions such as agreeing on one another’s existence, the 
withdrawal from a territory and creating communication.
The mediator’s entry may or may not change the duration of the conflict. 
Mediator may shorten, prolong or may not affect the process of the conflict with its 
activities.
Another change that may be realised with a mediation attempt is related to 
the existence of an overt conflict. The mediator’s activities may increase, decrease 
or may not change the state of conflict. For example, a mediator may intensify or 
de-escalate the conflict by using brute force or offering resources in an effort to gain 
concessions from the parties.
The entrance of a mediator may result in establishing ongoing 
mechanisms, such as a joint committee, a state, democracy, or a periodically 
organised summit can be cited as one of the other changes that may result during or 
as an outcome of the mediation attempt.
Sometimes the mediators, by using the media may change the power 
structure of the parties. Therefore the media can be an important tool in the process 
of mediation.
12
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
Based on the above literature review, this thesis compares and contrasts three 
mediation initiatives of the United States which were over the Bosnian conflict, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, respectively. For this purpose, 
the following components of the literature on mediation are used as the analytical 
tools of this study: Power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles/strategies of 
the mediator, entry of the mediator, timing of the mediator. Besides, such indicators 
are depicted in an effort to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of 
the mediation attempts: The relative power of the parties, redistribution of 
resources, policy or position changes by the parties, duration of the conflict, 
existence of an overt conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms and use of the 
media.
With this purpose, the first chapter of this study described the literature 
concerning the above mentioned components of mediation theory.
The second chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts over the 
Bosnian conflict. The third chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts 
over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The fourth chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts over the 
Haitian conflict. In the second, the third and the fourth chapters a brief historical 
background concerning the conflicts are presented. Then the analysis of disputes 
with respect to the above mentioned tools are conducted.
13
The fifth chapter comprises the findings derived from the analyses of three 
mediation attempts. The last chapter is the conclusion chapter in which the 
comparisons between the findings are stated.
14
CHAPTER II
US MEDIATION IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As one of the republics of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its 
independence on March 3, 1992, as a result of a referendum on February 29-March 
2, 1992. Despite the referendum, the Bosnian Serbs, radicalised by the President of 
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, proclaimed “the Serbian Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina” on March 27, and demanded to remain within Yugoslavia. On the 
other hand, the Bosnian Croats, with Croatia' firmly behind them, proclaimed the 
“Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia” on July 4, 1992. The armed struggle 
which began in March in Sarajevo was intensified with the international recognition 
of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992.
The first mediation attempt which was realised by the mediators of the 
European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
namely by Lord Carrington and Jose Cutiliero, did not produce fruitful results. 
Following the London Peace Conference of August 1992, the second mediation 
attempt was launched by the European Community and the United Nations headed
15
by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance, representing the European Community and 
the United Nations, respectively. The Vance-Owen Plan, despite its acceptance 
initially, faltered as the previous attempt. The European Community’s and the 
United Nations’ second attempt was headed by Lord Owen and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. The negotiation process, despite achieving a provisional agreement in 
Geneva on June 13, 1993, faced severe hindrance as the result of a mortar bomb 
attack by the Bosnian Serbs on a marketplace in Sarajevo, on February 5, 1994. The 
third mediation attempt which was led by the United States, was an initiative aiming 
to find a solution to a crucial part of the dispute. The United States’ mediator, 
Charles Redman managed to achieve a Muslim-Croat Federation by which the 
fighting between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims had come to an end and a 
Muslim-Croat front against the Bosnian Serbs was achieved.
The fourth mediation attempt targeting an overall solution to the dispute in 
Bosnia was launched by five states, namely the Contact Group comprising the USA, 
UK, Russia, France and Germany on April 25, 1994. The Contact Group plan called 
for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two, giving the Muslim-Croat 
Federation 51% and the Bosnian Serbs 49% of the territory, but the plan was 
rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who held 72% of the territory at that time.
On the other hand, the concept of 51% - 49% introduced by the Contact 
Group plan formed the basis of the mediation initiative of the USA (August 14, 
1995), led by the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke. The change 
in the balance of power in favour of the Muslim-Croat Federation vis a vis the 
Bosnian Serbs, as a result of the successful Croat offensive in Krajina of Croatia
16
and Bosnia and of the persistent bombings of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation against the Bosnian Serb positions paved the way to the negotiations 
and eventually to the signing of the Dayton agreement in Paris on December 14, 
1995.
2.2 ANALYSIS
2.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
The power of the mediator, that is the United States, stemmed first of all from its 
being the only superpower of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With 
its political, economic and military superiority, the United States has unquestionable 
leverage to be utilised over international issues, in particular in mediation efforts. 
Therefore, the United States, by using its considerable impact within the 
international organisations, such as NATO, IMF and World Bank in particular, had 
the ability to manipulate the direction of the dispute effectively. The second source 
of the United States’ power was its previous successful mediation attempt, which 
was finalised in a Muslim-Croat alliance, in May 1994.
2.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
When the war broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, the United States policy under the 
Bush administration was to accept the European argument which claimed what was 
happening in Bosnia was simply a “European problem”  ^and to avoid getting itself 
entangled in such an adventure on the brink of the coming elections in November 
1992. Contrary to his predecessor’s, the Clinton administration vowed for an active 
policy called “lift and strike” but was defied, several times, by the Europeans who
claimed that it was inappropriate. Following the victory of the Bosnian Serbs in the
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United Nations designated “safe-haven” town of Srebrenica in early July, 1995, the 
Clinton administration left this passive policy.
Behind this change there laid United States’ interests, particularly of the 
Clinton administration. The primary reason was to secure the outcome of the 
coming elections in November 1996. The worsening situation in Bosnia was 
harming to Clinton’s presidency as the Congress accused the administration for the 
ineffective US stand taken in the Bosnian conflict.^ For example, the bill which was 
prepared by the majority leader Bob Dole (Republican), the major adversary of 
Clinton in the coming elections, was targeting to lift the arms embargo over the 
Bosnian government unilaterallyAlthough the bill passed both the Congress and 
the House of Representatives, Clinton vetoed it.
Clinton’s veto aimed at the elimination of a drawback his own words 
created. In an effort to calm down its European allies whose soldiers were taken as 
hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in retaliation to NATO air strikes in late May 1995, 
Clinton had promised to deploy 25.000 US ground troops to assist NATO if a full- 
scale UN withdrawal was realised.^ As lifting the arms embargo would intensify the 
fighting, this situation would lead the Europeans to withdraw their troops within the 
UNPROFOR, eventually paving the way for the deployment of the United States’ 
ground troops in Bosnia. Clinton vetoed the bill due to the fresh memories of 
Somalia.
Combined with primary concern to end the war in Bosnia before the 
elections, the threat of United States’ combat troops inclusion due to the
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intensification of the fighting in Bosnia led the United States to announce its peace 
initiative headed by the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke in August 
1995, following the successful offensive by the Croats against the Bosnian Serbs in 
Krajina.
The complementary concerns were to increase the diminishing prestige of 
the United States due to the downfall of the United Nations’ safe-havens of 
Srebrenica and Zepa,^ and try not to lose its in the influence region’.
2.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ peace plan was based on the division of Bosnia between the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb entity, along the notion of 51% - 49% 
respectively. The plan tried to find a middle way by preserving the unitary nature of 
Bosnia as a federation but also called for the establishment of confederal links 
between the parties and neighbouring countries.
Within this context, the main objective of the mediator was to end the 
conflict. In order to realise this aim, the United States played several roles within 
this dispute ranging from facilitator to manipulator. The United States Assistant 
Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, as the leader of the United States delegation 
for the initiative assumed the role of communicator since the parties had refrained 
from holding direct talks with each other. Holbrooke, by shuttling among Sarajevo, 
Zagreb, Belgrade^ briefed the parties about what was in progress, discussed the 
positions of the parties and paved the way for several breakthroughs throughout the 
process, such as the Geneva meeting (September 8,1995), New York meeting
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(September 26, 1995) and Dayton meeting (November 1, 1995). Considering the 
fact that the parties were not talking to each other for quite a long time, the United 
States had also acted as a facilitator by bringing them around a negotiation table. 
The mediator had also issued a visa for the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan 
Milosevic, so as to remove an obstacle in front of the peace talks in Dayton and 
therefore facilitated the peace process.^
However, it would be wrong to argue that communication, solved alone the 
whole problem. As the only superpower of the world, the United States also used its 
leverage by which it became a manipulator. It managed to keep the parties within 
the process and to extract the necessary concessions with its power. The most 
significant example is, the United States’ assumption of leadership in moving 
NATO allies to decide pounding the Bosnian Serbs’ positions after the brutal 
shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo by the Bosnian S e rb s .A s a consequence of 
the use of force, the Bosnian Serbs stopped refusing to negotiate over the notion of 
51% - 49% and came to the negotiation table in Geneva, on September 8, 1995. In 
addition, with an effective and coordinated use of the NATO air strikes, Holbrooke 
managed to get a deal lifting the siege around Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serbs.'* 
With this move the United States acted as a manipulator as it pioneered to change 
the stream of the conflict.
Towards the end of the Dayton talks, the United States announced three 
deadlines. By imposing a deadline, the mediator had put a time pressure over the 
delegates in an effort to move them towards an agreement. The last deadline was 
reinforced by the president’s agreement to a letter written by the Secretary of State,
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Warren Christopher. The United States made it clear that if the deadline was not 
met at 15.00 (CET) on November 21, 1995, the United States would call off the 
talks and would definitely withdraw from the process. The delegates were also made 
known that if the United States withdrew, they would be left with the Europeans 
who kept announcing: “If the United States withdraws, we will withdraw too”'^ . 
Under the pressure of the last deadline, parties reached a compromise concerning 
the issue of Brcko which had previously caused a deadlock in the negotiations. 
Therefore the reinforced deadline made the expected impact and the United States, 
again, manipulated the process.
As manipulative tactics, the United States had often used carrots and sticks 
in order to make the parties act in desired ways. The most effective use of sticks was 
NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, as stated above. The United States, at 
the very beginning of the initiative, offered the parties to give some carrots like 
lifting trade sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and rewarding the Bosnian 
Muslims with economic aid if a settlement was reached.'"* In addition, the United 
States, as an effort to achieve the acceptance of the Bosnian Muslims concerning the 
notion of 51% - 49%, offered another carrot, arming and training the Bosnian army, 
if an agreement was attained. Besides, the Bosnian government was convinced to 
declare a cease-fire on October 6, 1995, only by promises of large amount of 
economic aid and military assistance in the event of peace. An important carrot for 
the Bosnian Muslims was the United States promise to participate in the NATO 
peace enforcement force.Finally, the most important sticks to both sides was the 
imposition of a serious deadline for the talks in Dayton.
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The United States had also acquired the role of formulator through deciding 
on the participants to the talks. There was a procedural problem concerning the 
question of who would speak for the Bosnian Serbs during the future peace talks. 
Neither the United States nor the Bosnian Government wanted to get into contact 
with the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb Army general 
Ratko Mladic, both indicted as war criminals by the International Court of Justice. 
Holbrooke, in a separate meeting with the President of Yugoslavia,'^ Slobodan 
Milosevic, achieved a procedural breakthrough according to which Milosevic would 
lead the joint negotiation team composed of Serbian and Bosnian Serbian 
delegates.'^ Another example for its formulator role, in the sense of reducing 
outside pressure during the talks, was realised when it chose the Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base, in Dayton, Ohio, the USA.'* Due to the nature of the base, the 
delegates felt free from the pressure of the media during the talks.B esides, the 
United States was generous in providing technological facilities, like the “Nintendo 
Room” °^, by which the delegates could easily negotiate, therefore the United States 
acted as a formulator through reducing the procedural complexities.
Another important contribution of the United States was that it acted as an 
enforcer of the deals and agreements reached throughout the process. Concerning 
the deal on lifting the siege over Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States, 
made it clear that unless the Bosnian Serbs complied with the deal, NATO air 
strikes would be resumed.^' Another enforcement was realised after the cease-fire 
agreement among the parties. One of conditions for the implementation of the 
cease-fire was clearing the roads of Sarajevo, but the Croats seemed to be 
postponing this in order to gain more territory. Holbrooke intervened and pressured
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the President of Croatia who backed the Croats in Sarajevo. Consequently, the 
Croats started to clear the mines. During the Da)don talks, the agreement which 
had established the Muslim-Croat Alliance under the pressure of the United States 
in 1994, was enforced by signing a pact to revitalise the Muslim-Croat Alliance on 
November 11, 1995.^^
The United States can not be deemed as a neutral mediator since it had a 
personal preference that the dispute should be resolved by punishing the Bosnian 
Serbs in one way or another. '^* This preference can be seen in its position towards 
the Vance-0 wen Plan. The plan could not gain the political backing from the United 
States on the grounds that it was unfair to the Bosnian Muslims.^^ Therefore, the 
United States can not be considered as a neutral mediator.
The United States can not be regarded as an impartial mediator either, 
stemming from the fact that it did not treat the sides equally and mostly sided with 
the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Bosnian Muslims in particular. For instance, as 
the United States had supported the legitimacy of the Bosnian government, 
statements like “opposing any partition of or secession from Bosnia” were mostly 
spelled out by high ranking officials of the United S t a t e s .B y  this way, the 
mediator had empowered the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs who 
advocated secession from Bosnia. Another empowerment of the Bosnian Muslims 
by the United States was realised after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. 
Holbrooke, in line with a demand coming from the President of Bosnian Presidency 
Alia Izetbegovic, announced that in case of an attack towards safe havens, “the 
United States would request NATO action”.^  ^ Similarly, the United States had also
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preferred to overlook the Muslim-Croat offensive so as to give them “time to gain 
more ground against the Bosnian Serbs” before the Dayton talks. In the opening 
secession of the Dayton talks, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, again 
empowered the Muslim-Croat Federation by emphasising the internationally 
recognised borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and^  ^ pushed for the removal of 
Karadzic and Mladic from office, in line with the demands from the Muslim led 
Bosnian government.
On the other hand, there were times when the United States seemed to be 
siding with the Bosnian Serbs. For example, the United States prevented the joint
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Croat-Muslim offensive against Banja Luka, a Bosnian Serb controlled town, as it 
could bring Serbia into the conflict. Although it seemed to be siding with the 
Bosnian Serbs, the United States was actually trying to secure the peace initiative. 
For this reason the United States was not an impartial mediator.
2.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
When the duration of the conflict is taken into account, the mediation attempt of the 
United States may seem as that of latecomer; but as the changing circumstances on 
the ground is considered, with the victory of the Croats in Krajina, timing of the 
United States was ripe. The United States administration which was heading 
towards the coming elections, had already been under pressure from the Congress 
concerning Bosnia. For this reason, the United States did not miss the opportunity 
provided when “the underdog started running” while the Bosnian Serbs “that held 
the upper hand previously, started slipping” .
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The parties were also ready to resume the process of diplomatic activities. 
Despite starting to get the upper hand, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were open 
to negotiate as three years of a state of war was very costly for all of the parties.^  ^
The Serbs having faced a severe blow in Krajina were also sympathetic towards a 
peaceful solution. '^* However, the Bosnian Serbs showed intransigence about 
starting to negotiate over the notion of 51% - 49%, by shelling a marketplace in 
Sarajevo. Therefore, the United States’ taking the lead in deciding to pound the 
Bosnian Serbs by using NATO air strikes, was very timely and eventually led the 
Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, in Geneva. In sum, it would not be wrong to 
argue that these timely interventions of the United States put the initiative on track.
2.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States did not intervene in the conflict upon invitation. Domestic 
concerns of the Clinton administration necessitated some action concerning Bosnia. 
The United States shied away from a militarily involvement and opted for a 
diplomatic one. For this reason, the United States entered as a mediator when it 
found a suitable timing. However, this entrance was not an imposed one, because all 
of the parties welcomed the initiative. The President of Croatia, F. Tudjman,^^ the 
President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic^^ and the President of the Bosnian 
Presidency, Alia Izetbegovic,^^ had stated their compliance with the initiative. There 
were no problems encountered in gaining acceptance from the parties. However, as 
the talks proceeded, the perception of the Bosnian Serbs of the United States 
changed, due to the mediator’s partial attitude towards the Muslim-Croat
Federation.38
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2.2.6 CHANGES REALISED
The most important change realised as a consequence of the United States’ 
mediation was achieving an end to the state of war. When the United States entered 
as a mediator, there was an overt conflict continuing in the battlefield. Although 
the initiative started in a peaceful manner, the intransigent attitude of the Bosnian 
. Serbs caused an increase in the fighting. Having the presidential elections at stake, 
the United States managed to eliminate this intransigent attitude by using its 
military leverage within NATO at the right time. Without a third party intervention, 
it would be impossible for the parties to negotiate, as the adversaries were not 
coming face to face since the failure of the Contact Group mediation attempt. Later 
on the mediator had also brokered a cease-fire agreement among the parties and
therefore tried to stop the fighting although minor clashes continued to take place 39
The United States, increased the relative power of the Muslim-Croat side 
by pounding the positions of the Bosnian Serbs decisively,'*'  ^ and by making public 
announcements siding with the Bosnian Muslims position.'*’ The United States had 
also promised to arm and train the Federation after the agreement so as to achieve a 
military balance against the Bosnian Serbs.'*  ^On the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs 
had a psychological gain, which was an official international recognition under the 
name of Republika Srpska in an effort to keep them within the process.'*^
Through the mediation of the United States, the parties made some 
redistribution in resources, like territorial adjustments. For example, the President 
of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs was obliged to 
give up Sarajevo and accept the deployment of NATO forces in Bosnia.'*'* As a
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result of such concessions, Yugoslavia freed itself from the United Nations’ 
sanctions."*  ^ Under pressure from the United States, Croatia managed to regain the 
region of Eastern Slavonia from the rebel Croatian Serbs."*^  During the mediation 
process, there were other resources available to the parties, particularly to the 
Muslim-Croat side, a total of $ 600 million to be given to the Federation for the 
reconstruction of Bosnia'^^and most importantly, 20.000 US ground troops to Bosnia 
for the enforcement of the peace.''* By promising these incentives, the United States 
ended up with the agreement.
The Bosnian Muslims were previously ruling out Serbian confederal links 
with Yugoslavia. In the agreement, the parties were assigned the right to form 
“special parallel relations” with neighbouring countries if only such relations 
honoured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia.''^ The parties accepted 
one another’s right of existence within a single state. The Bosnian Muslims 
recognised the Republika Srpska as a separate entity within the Bosnia- 
Herzegovina State while the Bosnian Serbs gave up their demands of secession. 
Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Bosnia were established.^" Bosnia 
became the 18U' member of the International Monetary Fund.^' Another important 
change was prohibiting war criminals, namely, the President of the Serbian 
leadership, Radovan Karadzic, and the general of the Bosnian Serb Army, Ratko 
Mladic, from standing for office. With the help of the United States’ mediation, 
such policy changes were realised by the parties.
Concerning the duration of the conflict, the United States’ intervention, 
particularly the one in which it used NATO air strikes, was influential in
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accelerating the peace process. With this move, the Muslim-Croat side felt more 
confident and the Bosnian Serbs accepted to start negotiating over the notion of 
the 51% - 49% and to lift the siege over Sarajevo. In addition, the deadline 
scheduled for the afternoon of November 21, gave momentum to the talks and can 
even be accepted as saved the process.
The media had shown great interest in the conflict, especially towards the 
talks held in Dayton, Ohio. The United States had also used this interest to change 
the power balance in favour of the Bosnian Muslims and to weaken the Bosnian 
Serbs. The most striking example appeared when there were three days left for the 
Dayton talks. The United States supplied evidence of the Bosnian Serb forces’ 
crimes against the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia to the public.
The United States helped the parties to establish the State of the Bosnia- 
Herzegovina with constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, it aimed to enforce 
peace by taking the leadership for deployment of Implementation Forces (IFOR) in 
Bosnia, as an ongoing mechanism. Besides, the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank were pulled into the process for Bosnia’s reconstruction. '^*
The findings related to this mediation attempt will be presented in the fifth
chapter.
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CHAPTER III
US MEDIATION IN THE PALESTINIAN - ISRAELI CONFLICT
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
I'he conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians may be regarded as one of the 
most complicated disputes in the international arena. The roots of this long-running 
problem go back to the establishment of Israel with the support of the United 
Nations, in 1948. Eventually, the Arab States’ rejection of the new status quo paved 
the way for a series of wars and a great amount of hostility between the Arabs and 
the Israelis.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War during which Israel occupied the whole of Sinai 
Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, forms the crux 
of the dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Six Day War had ended 
with the occupation of almost all of the Palestinian lands and therefore the 
immigration of the Palestinians to Arab States. In response, the United Nations 
Security Council adopted Resolution 242 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Following the 
1973 War between the Arabs and Israelis, the United Nations Security Council had
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also adopted Resolution 338 which called for negotiations in order to realise 
Resolution 242.
Hostility culminated had embraced the beginning of a peace process with the 
President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat’s, visit to Jerusalem and eventually ended in the 
Camp David Agreement in 1978. The agreement which was achieved under the 
mediation efforts of the United States gave the Sinai peninsula back to Egypt and 
opened the way for autonomy talks to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The Palestinians were by then politically and militarily organised under the 
leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which was neither recognised 
by Israel nor the United States. The primary reason behind this was the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation’s guerrilla warfare with the intention to destroy the State of 
Israel and establish an independent Palestine state in that area. Therefore, the Camp 
David Accord which enabled the Palestinians to have autonomy talks with the 
Israelis did not satisfy the Palestinians. Following this agreement, Israel occupied 
Lebanon in an attempt to force the Palestinian guerrillas to leave their bases.
As years went by, the frustration of the Palestinians living under Israeli 
military occupation had grown and led to a popular uprising in 1987. The impact of 
the uprising or intifada was so intense that it started to affect the domestic politics 
of Israel. The Palestinian problem became an important topic affecting the election 
propaganda of the parties. The Labour Party had announced that it accepted the 
principle of “land for peace” while the conservative Likud Party, staying firm on its 
hard-line position, stressed that no concessions should be made to the Palestinians. 
On the side of the Palestinians there were clear signs of flexibility, like declaring to
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rule out their determination to destroy Israel. Following such a flexible declaration, 
the United States resumed its contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 
1988, and proposed a plan in 1989 but was rejected by both of the parties of the 
dispute.
The conducive political environment for a peace initiative in the region 
following the Gulf War, led the United States to launch an initiative to convene a 
Middle East Peace Conference in 1991. The initiative was based on the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of “territory 
for peace”. Besides, the security and recognition of Israel and the political rights of 
Palestinians were to be provided.
The negotiation process started with the convention of the Middle East 
Peace Conference in Madrid. This had become feasible due to the intensive shuttle 
diplomacy of the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, and produced an 
important result like breaking the taboo of “no negotiations” between the parties.
The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank was achieved after a series of clandestine meetings between the parties 
in the light of secret Norwegian mediation. Following the signing of the accord in 
September 1993, the parties started to negotiate over its implementation. 
Eventually, they signed the Protocol on Economic Arrangements in April 1994, the 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas in May 1994, the Israel-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 1995 and the 
Hebron Agreement in January 1997. The process is still continuing.
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3.2 ANALYSIS
3.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ most important source of power was its status in the 
international arena at that time. The impact of the former Soviet Union over the 
Middle East eroded while the prestige of the United States was enjoying its peak as 
an outcome of the Gulf War. As a consequence, the United States found a suitable 
political atmosphere to exert its influence so as to convene a Middle East Peace 
Conference.
The United States, being the sole superpower of the world, following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union undoubtedly constituted a considerable degree of 
leverage in the eyes of the disputing parties. The United States’ superpower utilities 
was welcomed by the parties whenever they needed military or economic assistance 
during the thorny peace process.
However, the decisions and therefore the power of the United States over 
Israel, particularly during the Clinton administration, have been limited due to the 
effective Jewish lobby and the strategic importance and preponderance of Israel in 
comparison to the Arab States’.
3.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
The Middle East is a region that carries vital importance for the United States. This 
fact did not change with the end of the Cold War. For this reason, the United States 
had certain interests to be pursued when intervening to the conflict.
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The primary concern of the United States is its access to oil from the area 
where it imports half of its petroleum needs.' The existence of a conflict or a source 
of instability in the region that may threaten the flow of oil constitutes a crucial 
danger to the United States’ interests. Stemming from this fact, the United States 
stood firmly against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf Crisis and War.
The United States also pursues a containment policy towards extremist 
Islamist regimes like Iran that are considered as origins of exporting terrorism, in an 
effort to eliminate sources of instability. In addition, the United States view Iran, 
Iraq and Libya as threats because of these countries’ intention to become nuclear 
powers of the region.
In line with this concern over stability in the Middle East, the United States 
has long been aiming to resolve another source of instability: The Arab-lsraeli 
conflict. Therefore, the Post-Gulf War era was suitable enough to intervene for a 
comprehensive Arab-lsraeli peace agreement.
Another interest for the United States at stake was economic. The hostility 
present in the region, required the United States to make financial aid to the Middle 
East for a long time. As its strategic ally Israel is surrounded by unfriendly states, 
the United States has been channelling a great amount of financial capital to Israel, 
reaching $3 billion each year.^ Moreover, the United States has been investing 
financial and political capital during the peace process so as to achieve stability in 
the region, like organising an international donor conference for the Palestinian 
infrastructure and promising $ 500 million between 1994 and 1998 for its share.
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Therefore, the elimination of this hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis may 
lead to a considerable cut in the flow of financial capital to the region and 
eventually may result in the achievement of stability, with less cost to the United 
States.
The dispute between the Palestinians and Israelis which worsened due to the 
terrorist activities of the Islamist extremists has been constituting a threat to the 
United States’ interests. For this reason, it would not be wrong to argue that the 
mediator has been pursuing defensive motives rather than altruistic ones while 
deciding to intervene in the conflict.
3.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ peace initiative over the Middle East envisioned a two track 
approach according to which Israel would negotiate with the Arabs and the 
Palestinians separately. The initiative did not bring a specified, detailed proposal for 
the solution to the problem, but set a framework for the beginning of the 
negotiations among parties.
The initiative called for a solution based on the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 on the principles of land for peace so as to 
guarantee the security and recognition of Israel and legitimate political rights of the 
Palestinians.“^
The mediator’s primary objective was to bring the parties around a 
negotiation table as there existed no negotiation among the parties, namely Syria,
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Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel. For this reason the United 
States under the Bush administration, aimed to facilitate the whole process, in an 
attempt to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.
In its facilitator role, the mediator acted as a communicator between the 
Palestinians and Israelis since they did not recognise each other. The United States 
Secretary of State, James Baker, held several separate meetings with the Palestinian 
and Israeli delegation during his intense shuttle diplomacy to the region, started in 
early 1991 and lasted until late 1992.
Other than acting as “a telephone wire” ,^ the United States had suggested 
several proposals that might change perceptions and as a result change the positions 
of the parties over the main rules of the Conference, and therefore served as a 
formulator.*  ^ For example, Israel was ruling out the possibility of residents from 
East Jerusalem to be represented in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation while the 
Palestinians were insisting on their representation. The United States made a 
proposal according to which a Palestinian from a well-known Jerusalem family,
n
residing currently in Jordan may be included in the joint delegation. By this way, 
the Palestinians would agree that the East Jerusalem residents were represented 
while the Israelis would not be threatened that Jerusalem might appear as topic of 
discussion during the talks. To give another example to its formulator role, the 
United States had also tried to make an impact over the way the parties’ thought on 
the issue of the United Nations’ representation during the Conference. While Israel 
objected, the Palestinians insisted on the representation of the United Nations. The
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United States Secretary of State, James Baker, proposed for a United Nations 
representative as an observer, whose rights were limited taking notes only.^
A mediator as a formulator may also try to diminish outside pressure over 
the parties^ in an effort to protect the process, just like it was in Baker’s secret 
diplomacy. Baker preferred to hold private talks with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak 
Shamir, without accepting even a note-taker in the room. During his separate 
meetings with the Arabs, mostly a translator was present. This protection against 
leakages might be seen necessary to impede the leaders to back off from 
fundamental concessions in the face of domestic opposition.'®
When parties failed to name the date and venue for the next round of talks, 
the United States can be viewed to have served as a facilitator in the sense of 
formulator due to its efforts to move the parties to the negotiation table, by doing 
the job in proxy.” On the other hand, such announcements on the date and venue 
may also be viewed as an open sign of impatience of the United States about 
deadlocks over procedural matters, and therefore may be considered as 
manipulating the process by imposing a solution to the impasse.
United States under the Bush administration sometimes, applied 
manipulative tactics like sticks and carrots when the process faced impasse. The 
most striking example of the United States’ appearance as a manipulator occurred 
over Israel’s settlement policy in the territories which belonged to the Palestinians 
before the 1967 war, namely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. This
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policy has been causing strains and deadlocks throughout the whole process, as the 
Arabs and particularly the Palestinians have been very sensitive on this issue.
In an effort to protect the peace process from faltering, the Bush 
administration exerted pressure over Israel. Firstly, the United States Secretary of 
State, James Baker, labelled the settlements as “an obstacle to peace”’^ . However, 
such words were not enough to persuade the hard-liner Shamir government, 
committed to its settlement policy. Secondly, the United States used its economic 
leverage against Israel when the Likud government announced another settlement in 
Eshkolot, the West Bank, during Baker’s intense efforts to convene the Conference. 
Thirdly, the Bush administration tried to force Israel to stop building new 
settlements in the disputed territories by calling the United States Congress to delay 
for 120 days its approval of loan guarantees to Israel. Furthermore, the President of 
the United States, George Bush vowed veto if the loan guarantees were approved by 
the Congress on September 6, 1991. Although the Congress acted in line with the 
president’s will, Israel kept on building while bilateral talks were going on between 
the parties in Washington, DC. As this situation led to the Palestinian reaction. 
Baker announced that the United States would not provide $ 10 billion in loan 
guarantees to Israel unless settlement building was halted in the disputed territories 
by February 24, 1992.'"* By this way the United States created a direct link between 
an economic need of Israel to halting of settlements which would eliminate an 
important source of conflict in the dispute.
The United States’ sticks or withholding carrots policy, aiming to change 
the policy of Israel over settlements, did not lead to the expected outcome until the
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victory of the Labour Party headed by Yitzak Rabin over the Likud. The Rabin 
govermnent which was supported by the United States administration due to its 
flexible views on the peace process, announced a freeze on new building contracts 
by Israel on July 16, 1992.'^ Following this move, the United States stopped 
withholding the carrots and agreed to grant $ 10 billion in loan guarantees to 
Israel.'^ The mediator’s manipulative tactics over the settlement issue resulted in a 
change in the actions of Israel.
The deportation policy of Israel against the Palestinians constituted another 
issue that created pauses during the process. The Bush administration had used 
sticks against Israel and therefore acted as a manipulator by not vetoing the two 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemning Israel’s deportation 
decisions of Palestinians, on March 27, 1991 and January 6, 1992 respectively.
United States under the Clinton administration, continued to support the 
negotiation process by acquiring the roles ranging from facilitator to manipulator. 
United States assumed the role of facilitator in the sense of formulator by 
presenting proposals in an attempt to achieve a difference in the perceptions of the 
parties during bilateral talks, held under the framework of the Madrid Process. For 
example, the United States offered different versions of draft proposals on the 
Palestinian authority in disputed territories. However, it was the secret Norwegian 
mediation that secured the Declaration of Principles between the two adversaries. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to stress that the United States had an impact over 
this outcome by tacitly working on the perceptions of Yasser Arafat, in other words 
by assuming the role of formulator. Having knowledge about the Oslo clandestine
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meetings, the United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, deliberately 
gave the impression that Israel and Syria were heading towards an agreement during 
his shuttle diplomacy. Alarmed over the prospect of repeating the Israeli-Egyptian 
experience of Camp David Accord, Arafat moved quickly towards the agreement.
Following the Oslo Accord, the United States mostly continued to leave the 
Israelis and Palestinians negotiate directly, in line with Israel’s demand, without 
being present in the negotiation room.^ *^  The mediator enabled a difficult process 
keep going. The United States intervened at times when the process came across 
impasses. In the aftermath of the tension created by Israel’s decision to build new 
settlements in the West Bank, and by a series of suicide bombings against Israelis in 
1995, the process started to falter and eventually the talks collapsed. The United 
States swiftly organised a meeting for the parties so as to bring the parties together 
and resume the talks, in other words acted as a facilitator. During this meeting, the 
United States pressurised the Palestinians to take necessary actions against terrorism 
and at the same time offered important financial benefits to them in order to ease 
their severe economic difficulties.^' Therefore, by using carrots and sticks policy 
the mediator changed the stream of the conflict and restored the peace process. In 
sum, it can be regarded as manipulated the process.
The mediator tried to act as a manipulator by using its resources as the sole 
superpower when the peace process was endangered due to a series of bombings by 
the Islamic extremists in March 1996. In order to protect the process, the United 
States pledged to provide a kind of advanced technology against terrorism to Israel 
which was a carrots policy.^^ The United States also arranged an anti-terrorism
39
summit in an attempt to give political backing to the advocator of the peace process, 
the prime minister of Israel, Shimon Peres. Peres seemed to be losing his domestic 
backing due to an increase in the terrorist activities and facing an early election 
against his main adversary, the hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu.^^ The mediator tried 
to influence the dynamics of the conflict by making it clear that the United States 
with its whole economic, military and political superiority threw its full support 
behind the peace process and therefore behind Peres.
Communication channels were not always open throughout the process. For 
example, stemming from the tension in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre in 
February 1994^ *^ and from the stubborn position of the Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu against opening a direct channel with the Palestinian National 
Author i ty the  United States acted as a communicator for a while between the 
parties.
The United States can not be regarded neutral throughout the process 
stemming from the fact that it had certain preferences concerning the outcome of the 
process. For example, the United States did not favour a Palestinian state in the
region,^^ was opposing Israel’s settlement policy in the disputed territories,^^ and the
28redivision of Jerusalem .
Commenting on the mediator’s impartiality necessitates analysing the 
stances of the two United States administrations, namely the Bush and the Clinton 
administration separately. During the Bush administration, viewed as the most pro- 
Arab of post-War United States presidents, the mediator may be regarded as having
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acted in a relatively balanced way in comparison to the Clinton administration 
which has been regarded as pro-Israeli?^
The Bush administration pursued almost a balanced policy towards both 
parties. It severely pressurised Israel against the latter’s settlement policy in the 
disputed lands in 1991?° and used its leverage in the United Nations Security 
Council in favour of a resolution condemning Israel for its deportation policy in 
1992. However, the mediator was not continuously on the Palestinian side. In 
order to convene the Conference, it also pressurised the Palestinians to get some 
concessions over the main rules of the Conference.On the other hand, it might be 
thought that the United States would mostly have sided with the Palestinians, taking 
into consideration the fact that they were the weak side. But the Bush 
administration’s domestic concerns, like securing the Jewish votes in the 1992 
general elections, had also made an impact over some of its decisions which are 
viewed as biased by the Arabs. For example, it urged the United Nations to abrogate 
“Zionism is racism” article and promised to help the Israelis “maintain their 
qualitative edge” in conventional arms.^ '*
The Clinton administration has clearly pursued a partial policy in favour of 
Israel. In the aftermath of a deportation crisis which stalled the negotiations in 1993, 
the mediator prevented the United Nations Security Council from imposing
O C
sanctions against Israel. The United States pressured the Palestinians, the injured 
party, to come to the negotiation table following the Hebron massacre during which 
forty Palestinian worshippers were killed by an Israeli settler°°. However, it 
immediately issued an executive order to freeze the assets of twelve Middle East
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terrorist groups in the United States after twenty-one Israelis were killed in a suicide 
bomb attack by the Islamic Jihad. The United States did not pursue a similar 
action in similar crises in which both the Palestinians and the Israelis were victims. 
Following an Israeli decision to approve new settlements in East Jerusalem in 1997, 
the United States considered the action as complicating the situation^* but vetoed a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution labelling the Israeli decision illegal and 
a threat to the Middle East process.^^ Although the Clinton administration has 
generally pursued a pro-Israeli stance, it has sometimes stood by the Palestinian 
side in an effort not to lose the process, facing conservative policies of the 
Netanyahu government. For example, following Netanyahu’s rejection of Clinton’s 
request to delay the above mentioned settlements, the United States decided to 
attend an international forum, organised by Yasser Arafat, to which Israel was not 
invited in March, 1997.'*°
3.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
The time was definitely ripe for the United States to intervene, for various reasons. 
First of all, the Cold-War which led to the two superpower rivalries in several parts 
of the world, including the Middle East had come to an end.'*' Some Arab states’ 
“big brother”, the Soviet Union’s influence was eliminated to a considerable degree 
with the end of the Cold-War. Moreover, the Gulf War alliance in which the Arabs 
and Israelis stood side by side, resulted in a great prestige for the United States in 
the eyes of the moderate Arab states,'*  ^ an important feature which lacked 
previously.
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There was a hurting stalemate situation concerning the parties. The Israelis 
were living with terrorism since the intifada broke out in 1987. The Palestinians had 
become aware of the fact that violence did not bring statehood and therefore were 
ready for a political charmel. Besides, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation faced 
diplomatic isolation and severe economic difficulties as a result of its support of 
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.'*^  It was looking for a way that could break 
this deadlock. As a consequence, the parties’ need in a negotiation process in 
addition to the conducive international atmosphere, made the timing ripe for the 
United States’ intervention.
3.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States was invited to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict by some Arab 
countries present in the Gulf alliance, to help them organise a peace conference on 
the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War.“*“^ Besides, it had certain stakes 
that required the convention of such a conference, like achieving stability in the 
region. Consequently, the United States entered into the dispute by announcing its 
initiative on March 1, 1991.
Concerning gaining acceptance from the parties, the United States’ initiative 
was welcomed by the Palestinians. However, the Israelis viewed it with a little 
concern due to the initiative’s “land for peace” formula, although they, too, accepted 
the initiative.'*^
Throughout the process, some changes occurred in the perceptions of the 
parties about the mediator. The United States’ pressure over Israel about its
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settlement poliey in the disputed lands during late 1991 and early 1992 led to 
accusations of anti-Semitism against President George Bush."^  ^ The Clinton 
administration’s inability to take tough actions against Israel unlike the Bush 
administration, caused reactions from the Palestinian side especially after the 
election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the Israeli prime minister."*  ^ However, such 
changes in perceptions did not lead to a declaration demanding exclusion of the 
United States from the process.
3.2.6 CHANGES REALISED
The most significant change as a result of the United States’ intervention was 
achieving the beginning of a negotiation process between the long time adversaries. 
Getting them around a negotiation table constituted a remarkable change 
considering the fact that there was no direct communication between Israel and the 
Palestinians since 1967.
When the United States intervened to organise a conference, the weak party 
was the Palestinian side. They were the ones deprived of their lands in the aftermath 
of the 1967 War, having no economic, military and political power. For this reason, 
the Palestinians’ relative power was increased due to being called for a Middle 
East Peace Conference, especially after the Gulf War isolation. Bush 
administration’s firm attitude against Israel’s settlement policy had further 
empowered the Palestinians in 1991. Besides, the United States voted in favour of a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning Israel because of its 
deportation policy in 1992. Therefore, it would not be wrong to state that the United 
States under the Bush administration mostly empowered the weak side against the
44
stronger side. However, this increase in the relative power of the Palestinians did 
not lead to an agreement.
The same empowerment in favour of the Palestinians can not be seen during 
the Clinton administration. In contrast, it was the Israeli side that has been 
empowered. United States acted in favour of Israel within the United Nations 
Security Council in the aftermath of several crises like the deportation crisis of 
1993, the land expropriation crisis of 1995, the tunnel crisis of 1996 and the 
settlement crisis of 1997. United States indicated that there was an important source 
of power in favour of Israel in the Security Council. United States, sometimes 
increased the power of the Palestinians as well, like attending a regional conference 
to which Israel was not invited following the settlement crisis of 1997. 
Nevertheless, it was considerably less in comparison to Israel’s empowerment.
The most important policy change was the parties’ recognition of one 
another following the signing of the Declaration of Principles of 1993. Israel 
changed its policy of no communication with “the Arab population of Judaea,
A Q
Samaria and Gaza” and the Palestinian National Council repealed the clauses in its 
Charter calling for the destruction of Israel and guerrilla warfare against the Jewish 
state.'^  ^ Another important policy change by Israel was agreeing to withdraw its 
troops from the Gaza Strip and certain parts of the West Bank which constituted, 
from then, the self-rule areas of the Palestinian National Authority. In particular, the 
Likud which has been the ruling party in Israel since 1996, abandoned its ideology 
of Greater Israel by signing the Hebron Deal of 1997.^° Moreover, the prime
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minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, softened his attitude over the creation of a
Palestinian state.51
As a consequence of the process, there was a redistribution of resources, 
like land. The Palestinians started to exert self-rule over the Gaza Strip and several 
cities of the West Bank. Moreover, the parties received certain resources ranging 
from intangible to tangible during the peace process. The most important 
psychological benefit extended to the Palestinians under the Bush administration 
was being recognised as a people by the world and having the tacit leadership of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation to negotiate on their behalf On the other side, 
the Bush administration’s clear influence in favour of Israel within the Security 
Council, the repeal of “Zionism is racism” article by the United Nations with the 
United States’ urging constituted important intangible resources available to Israel.
The parties had also the chance to benefit from tangible resources during the 
United· States’ mediation. Israel received military aid like jets and missiles under the 
Bush administration '^^ and advanced technology against terrorism under the Clinton 
administration^^ other than its usual $ 3 billion a year. The Palestinians achieved a 
channel of financial capital through a donor conference organised by the United 
States under the Bush administration.^*’ Besides, they received the United States’ 
preferential trade treatment to imports from the Palestinian self-rule areas under the
r 7
Clinton administration.
At the time of intervention there was an overt conflict stemming from the 
intifada. For this reason, Israel’s main motive to go to the negotiation table was to
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free itself from violence. However, terrorist actions continued to take place after the 
United States’ intervention, but this time were directed against the peace process. 
The Islamic extremists, namely Hamas and the Islamic Jihad launched several 
terrorist activities in Israel for the collapse of the process. Moreover, public opinion 
in Israel started to show frustration about the process, because of the continuous 
violence. Therefore, it can not be stated that the mediation effort of the United 
States led to a decrease in overt conflict, let alone to an end.
The United States’ entrance into the conflict as a mediator did not lead to an 
important change in the duration of the confliet. However, the mediator’s insistent 
attitude towards the parties had sometimes shortened the process to resume the talks 
or to achieve an agreement, like it happened in resuming talks after the tunnel crisis 
of 1996^* and in the Hebron Deal of 1997.^^
The United States guided the parties to establish ongoing mechanisms for 
different purposes. For example, after a series of terrorist activities in early 1996, 
the United States organised an anti-terrorism summit in Sharm el-Shaikh, to be 
followed up later on.^° Moreover, a high level joint committee concerning economic 
and political issues would be established between the Palestinian National Authority
and United States.61
The peace process which was produced as a result of the United States’ 
intervention led to an immense media attention. From the beginning of the process, 
the media showed remarkable interest. The White House ceremony of 1993 and 
1995, several suicide bomb attacks by the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the
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assassination of Yitzak Rabin by an Israeli extremist, the election of Benjamin 
Netanyahu were important headlines in the media. Besides, such an interest brought 
about a global awareness concerning the conflict which previously lacked.
The fifth chapter will reveal the findings derived from the analysis of the 
United States mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
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CHAPTER IV
US MEDIATION IN HAITIAN CONFLICT
4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected the President of Haiti on 16 December 1990. He 
was Haiti’s first freely elected president and had taken office in February 1991. 
Aristide was ousted and forced into exile after a military coup led by General Raoul 
Cedras, on September 30, 1991
Immediately after the coup, Haiti under the rule of a military led government 
had become subject to economic sanctions of the United States. Under the influence 
of the United States, the Organisation of American States also imposed a trade 
embargo by which the de facto Haitian government accepted mediation of the 
Organisation of American States. However, these economic sanctions acted as a 
double-edged sword due to the worsening economic conditions in Haiti when boats 
full of Haitians started to flee to the United States.
Despite its leverage firmly fortified by the United States, the Organisation of 
American States’ mediation could not produce the expected outcome. 
Consequently, the United States, under the Clinton administration, enabled the
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intervention of the United Nations as a mediator. The outcome of this mediation 
was the Governor’s Island Agreement between Aristide and Cedras, brokered by the 
United Nations and the Organisation of American States, on July 3, 1993. However, 
as the army and police sponsored violence continued inside the country and blocked 
Aristide’s return to Haiti, the agreement had become unenforceable. The United 
Nations, particularly under the influence of the United States, reimposed the 
economic sanctions which were suspended due to the signing of the agreement, but 
this did not result in the restoration of Aristide to power.
It is imperative to state that it would be an oversimplification to accept the 
Organisation of American States and later on accompanied by the United Nations as 
mediators. Since, from the very beginning of the dispute, the United States acted as 
the third party who intervened in an influential manner. Although it did not prefer to 
launch a peace initiative unilaterally, stemming from its previous, unpopular 
interventions in the area, the United States was the “concealed mediator” during the 
first stage of the mediation attempts.
Following the failure of the Governor’s Island Agreement, the United States 
intervened more “visibly” and gradually increased the quality of pressure over the 
military junta, like getting the United Nations to extend its sanctions and trying to 
deter the junta through threats of military invasion by the United States. The second 
stage of the mediation attempts started when the United States, convinced that even 
tougher economic sanctions did not make the expected impact, sent a last-chance 
delegation led by the former president Jimmy Carter to Haiti. While Carter’s role in 
the mediation was continuing, Clinton ordered the dispatch of a number of United
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States fleet carrying American soldiers to Haiti. Eventually, the imminent danger of 
invasion by the United States, accompanied by Carter’s appeasing attitude towards 
General Cedras paved the way to an agreement between the United States and the 
military junta on September 18, 1994. On September 19, 1994 the United States 
soldiers started to occupy Haiti to compel the junta to keep their word and assist the 
country in its journey to restoration of democracy. Consequently, President Aristide 
returned on October 15, 1994 to Haiti and a new government was formed on 
November 8, 1994.
4.2 ANALYSIS
4.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
As it is cited in the previous section, the Haitian case can be analysed in two stages: 
The first stage and the second stage mediation. In the first stage mediation attempt, 
the United States had a concealed mediator role and in the second stage of the 
mediation attempt, the United States had sent Carter as its representative to Haiti.
In this context, during the first stage, the power of the mediator stemmed 
from its being the superpower with its overwhelming political, economic and 
military preponderance. Its remarkable leverage within the international 
organisations, like the Organisation of American States and the United Nations 
made a considerable impact and changed the structure of the conflict. The United 
States, drew these two international organisations into the picture and directed their 
impact over the dispute, like the imposition', extension^ and eventually the 
globalisation of economic sanctions.
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However, the power of the United States against the military junta had 
started to erode as the dispute continued, because of a series of reasons. First of all, 
the devastating impact of the economic sanctions was only felt by the ordinary, poor 
Haitian citizens, not by the military junta. It took nineteen months to impose 
sanctions that would be particularly harmful to the junta which by that time formed 
a structure for surviving under the sanctions.'* Secondly, the actions and therefore 
credibility of the United States were also affected due to its domestic concerns. For 
example, the Bush administration eased the economic sanctions against Haiti when 
it became subject to the pressure of an American business elite^ and the 
administration pressured Aristide because of its need to have an end to the refugee 
crisis.*^  Such actions clearly led to the encouragement of the military junta which 
eventually was not deterred by numerous threats of military invasion by the United 
States.
The mediator’s power over Aristide was limited as well, though it achieved 
some changes on the stubborn attitude of Aristide. This limit stemmed from the fact 
that Aristide was the democratically elected but ousted president of Haiti. The 
United States, labelling itself as the defender of democraey could not exert much 
pressure on the ousted president.
In the second stage, the power of the mediator came mostly from its 
representative Carter’s good relations with Cedras and Aristide. Both had 
confidence in Carter and even had asked for his mediation efforts at the beginning
n
of the conflict.
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The mediator’s seeond souree of power depended on its being a superpower. 
The United States’ military blockade around Haiti continued while the former 
president of the United States, Carter, was negotiating with the junta. Carter made it 
very clear that the invasion was imminent and a massive military force of the United 
States, whose mission could cause physical harm to the families of the junta and the
O
army. The apparent existence of such a blockade around the island constituted an 
important source of power for the mediator. The confidence felt towards Carter 
enabled the junta to comprehend that an invasion was really imminent if they did 
not step down and that this was not a bluff.
4.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
The stakes that made the United States enter as a third party proliferated throughout 
the dispute. Chronologically speaking, its first stake was to restore democracy in 
Haiti in an effort not to set a bad precedent to potential threats to the other 
democratic states in the backyard of the United States. Both the Bush 
administration^ and Clinton administration'*^ underscored the significance of this 
factor for the United States.
Chronologically the second but as for its quality, the primary stake of the 
United States was to eliminate the refugee problem caused by the conflict. The 
forcible repatriation policy towards the refugees which was started by the Bush 
administration "and continued to be applied by the Clinton administration, faced 
criticisms from domestic and international arena. Clinton was even accused of being 
racist'^ due to this policy.
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The last but as crucial as the previous stake of the mediator was to restore its 
loss of credibility in the eyes of the military junta. The ineffectiveness of the 
economic sanctions against the coup leaders and its supporters, repatriation policy, 
implicit signals to the junta by the United States that Aristide was not much 
trusted’^  had resulted in a loss of credibility for the United States.*"^  These defensive 
motives that seem to be perceived as threatening the national interest of the United 
States, were the driving force behind the mediator’s actions. During the second 
stage of the mediation attempt the stakes of the mediator did not show any changes.
4.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
The United States, as the concealed mediator of the first stage had mostly acquired 
the role of manipulator by changing the structure of the conflict drastically. It 
enabled the begirming of the mediation process which was previously rejected by 
the military junta. By imposing economic sanctions over Haiti'^ and using its 
influence within the Organisation of American States to do the same,'^ the United 
States paved the way for negotiations which had started under the framework of the 
Organisation of American States.
The United States had also manipulated the course of events by offering 
carrots and sticks. For example, the Clinton administration offered carrots like, 
giving $ 50 million in non-lethal aid to the military in January 1993'^ and $ 1 billion 
project for the revitalization of the Haitian economy in March 1993 if the junta 
agreed to step down. However, as the junta did not show positive signs for the 
expected outcome and refused to negotiate, the United States used its leverage 
within the United Nations for a global oil and arms embargo against Hai t i .Such a
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sticks policy manipulated the process and restarted the negotiations '^^ which ended 
up with the Governor’s Island Agreement, on July 3, 1993. The United Nations’ 
sanctions, which were suspended in accordance with the agreement, were resumed 
upon the recommendation of the United States^’ when the junta did not honour the 
agreement. However, reimposing the sticks did not bear fruit despite the fact that 
they were fortified by a United Nations’ approval for a military invasion of Haiti by 
the United States.^ ·^
The mediator had also acquired the role of formulator by making specific 
proposals for the resolution of the conflict. For example, as part of the negotiations 
held under the framework of the United Nations and the Organisation of American 
States, the United States proposed the deployment of an international police force to 
oversee transition to democracy in Haiti.^ ·^  Another example for its formulator role 
in an attempt to influence perceptions of the parties was realised during the early 
1994. The United States’ proposal was to find a compromise solution to the 
problem, but this was rejected by Aristide.' '^*
The United States, as the concealed mediator of the first stage, can also be 
regarded as a communicator, on the grounds that it, despite in an implicit manner, 
enabled the beginning of the indirect negotiations between Aristide and the junta.
In the second stage of the mediation, the United States can be regarded as 
having manipulated the dispute by creating a military blockade around Haiti during 
Carter’s negotiation with the junta since the blockade changed the dynamics of the 
conflict. Moreover, Carter, as the representative of the United States, acquired the
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role of communicator. He earried the message that an invasion was imminent. He 
may also be viewed as having acted as a formulator working on the perceptions of 
the junta that an invasion was imminent.
In the first stage, the mediator can not be accepted as neutral, because it had 
a certain, specified solution to the dispute: Securing democracy in its backyard 
through restoring Aristide to power^  ^ and ending the Haitian refugee flood to its 
own territory. Since the United States had these preferences concerning the 
resolution of the dispute, it can not be regarded as a neutral mediator.
United States can not be accepted as an impartial mediator either. From the 
very beginning of the conflict its position was clear. It demanded an end to the coup 
and eventually the return of the ousted president Aristide to power. For this reason, 
throughout the process it mostly sided with Aristide. For instance, the United States 
immediately suspended its military and economic aid to Haiti, encouraged the
98Organisation of American States to take a similar action, called the United Nations 
to impose a worldwide oil and arms embargo on Haiti, urged the United Nations 
to reimpose the global embargo for the application of the Governor’s Island
Agreement,^*  ^and tried to deter the junta through a series of threats of invasion"” .31
However, the United States had sometimes pressured Aristide and therefore 
can be regarded as having sided with the junta. For example, the Bush 
administration, in an effort to solve the conflict before the general elections in 
November 1992, pressured Aristide to meet and therefore recognise the military 
backed prime minister of Haiti, Marc Bazin.^  ^ The Clinton administration also
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pressurised Aristide to grant amnesty to the military in an effort to secure the 
enforcement of the Governor’s Island Agreement which had become inapplicable 
due to Cedras’ amnesty demand. Furthermore, Aristide accepted to meet a Haitian 
delegation under the pressure of the United States in early 1994. '^’ However, it is 
imperative to state that the main motive behind these scarce pressures over Aristide 
was to put an end to the conflict through restoring him to power. The United States’ 
main position did not change, but it tried to achieve some minor alterations in 
Aristide’s position in order to resolve the conflict quickly. For this reason, the 
United States was mostly biased towards Aristide throughout the conflict.
During the second stage of the mediation, the United States can not be 
regarded as neutral because it continued to pursue the same stakes. As for its 
impartiality, although there was a relative increase in the power of the junta as a 
result of the second stage mediation, the United States can be accepted as partial 
towards Aristide stemming from the fact that there was a blockade around Haiti 
while Carter’s negotiation continued.
4.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
Q C
The United States’ manipulative actions with the aim of paving the way for the 
Organisation of American States’ mediation attempt can be viewed as being early. 
The parties, particularly the junta had not yet started suffering from the 
consequences of the conflict. Besides, the economic sanctions were solely affecting 
the ordinary Haitian people rather than the coup leaders and their supporters. Being 
the ousted president of a country, Aristide was also in a rigid position. The conflict
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had not reached the hurting stalemate situation when the United States started its 
manipulative actions.
The timing of the second stage mediation can be regarded as ripe. The 
conflict had reached its third year by the time Carter’s role in the mediation started. 
Throughout the second stage of the mediation attempt the pressure of the United 
States and that of the international community particularly over the junta continued. 
The pressures had reached their peak point, like the imposition of a global embargo 
by the United Nations, freezing of the coup leaders’ assets and threats of an 
imminent United States’ invasion to Haiti. Aristide who had been waiting to be 
reinstated for three years was also under the pressure from the United States, though 
it took place rarely. There was a hurting stalemate situation. For this reason, the 
timing of the second stage mediation was right and eventually avoided an imminent 
invasion.
4.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States, as the concealed mediator, was not invited to solve the conflict 
by any of the parties. Its interests such as, protecting a democracy in its backyard 
and eliminating the refugee crisis forced the United States to intervene as a third 
party to the dispute. Therefore, in the first stage the mediator’s entry can be regarded 
as imposed on the parties. Aristide, the weaker party in the dispute, was in need of 
the United States’ support. For this reason, he welcomed the intervention of the 
United States and its contribution to internationalise the matter through the 
Organisation of American States and the United Nations. However, Aristide had 
sometimes hardened his attitude towards the United States during the dispute. For
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example, Aristide had become critical about the Bush administration’s forcible 
repatriation policy of the Haitian refugees and its decision to ease economic 
sanctions on Haiti in favour of the American businessmen.^*’ There was also tension 
between Aristide and the United States under the Clinton administration when the 
former rejected the proposals prepared by the United States to break the impasse 
between the ousted president and the military junta in February and March, 1994.^’
In the second stage, the entry of the mediator can be regarded as an accepted 
one, in the figure of Carter. Aristide had asked the Carter Centre to mediate at the 
outset of the dispute.^* Besides, the coup leader General Cedras had asked for 
Carter’s mediation to avoid a United States military invasion of Hai t i .These 
acceptances enabled the Clinton administration to try a last-ditch attempt.
4.2.6 CHANGES REALISED
Although it was the second stage mediation that achieved the expected changes, like 
the reinstatement of Aristide and stepping down of the junta, there were some 
changes realised during the first stage mediation attempt as well.
The most striking change is related with the duration of the conflict. The 
first stage mediation can be regarded as having extended the duration of the conflict. 
The primary reason behind this was the United States’ loss of credibility in the eyes 
of the junta because it sent contradictory signals during the dispute. For instance, 
economic sanctions imposed by the United States in October 1991'**^  were eased in 
order to protect the interests of the American businessmen in February, 1992"*'. 
Moreover, the United States’ pressure over Aristide was also encouraging the junta
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not to step down. Under the Clinton administration, Aristide was forced to grant an 
amnesty to the military which was a point that he had previously rejected.'*  ^Besides, 
the ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions which were harming only the poor 
Haitians had also contributed to this loss of credibility and therefore caused 
prolongation of the conflict.
Being deprived of his power and living in exile, Aristide was the weaker 
party of the dispute. On the other hand, the junta was relatively more powerful, 
because it held the power in Haiti through its military and police force. From the 
beginning, the United States generally sided with the weaker party and tried to 
empower him, by suspending economic aid to Haiti and refusing to recognise the 
military junta on October 1, 1991; by freezing all Haitian government assets in the 
United States;'*  ^ and influencing the Organisation of American States to impose a 
trade embargo on Haiti. Another example of empowering the weaker side was 
realised when the military regime in Haiti ratified the formation of a new civilian 
government on May 11, 1994. The United States immediately declared the new 
government illegal and cancelled the visas of all nominated ministers.'*'*
In the first stage, the mediator had sometimes played the card in favour of 
the military junta in order to compel Aristide not to block the way leading to a 
resolution. For example, it pressurised Aristide over granting amnesty to the coup 
leaders in October, 1993 and it forced the ousted president to meet the junta backed 
de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in June 1992. The United States had even 
welcomed an alternative set of proposals prepared by an ad-hoc anti-Aristide 
congressional “crisis committee”.'*^ However, throughout the dispute, the United
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States can be considered as mostly increased the relative power of Aristide in 
comparison to the junta’s.
In comparison with the previous mediation attempt, the power of the junta 
was relatively increased during the second stage mediation. For example Carter 
denounced claims that Cedras was a dictator.'*  ^ Moreover, the agreement had 
provided the junta “honourable retirement”'*^ by which Carter tried to change 
Cedras’ image in the public opinion which was tarnished due to well publicised 
human rights abuses during the first stage mediation attempt. However, when the 
big picture is observed, there was an overt empowerment of Aristide as there was a 
military blockade around Haiti while Carter was negotiating.
During the dispute, the United States mostly tried to change the intransigent 
position of the military junta by offering some tangible and intangible resources. 
The intangible and the most important resource was granting amnesty to the military 
leaders by Aristide if the junta agreed to step down, in October 1993. Among the 
tangible ones. United States offered to give $ 50 million in nonlethal military aid 
and a $ 1 billion grant over five years to the Haitian military. In the first stage, the 
mediator’s only resource for Aristide could be his reinstatement which was realised 
as a result of the second stage mediation.
When the United States intervened through economic means, there was 
oppression over the supporters of Aristide by the military. Since the coup, the 
military and the police force tightened control in Haiti by enforcing curfews and 
arresting pro-Aristide Haitians. The military junta had the control of the Haitian
61
National Assembly by way of using brute force. Its armed soldiers had pressurised 
the law makers to declare the presidency vacant on October 7, 1991.'*^  During 
September 1992, there was an escalation of violence towards the Aristide nominated 
Malval government by the military leaders and opponents of Aristide. Moreover, a 
joint United Nations-Organisation of American States observer mission in Haiti 
charged the Haitian military of committing “numerous and grave” human rights 
abuses in 1993. The aim of the junta was to erase traces of Aristide. For this reason, 
despite the fact that there was an increase in violence during the conflict, it can not 
be argued that it was a result of the intervention.
At the outset of the dispute, the junta’s position was to rule out any 
possibility to start negotiations on the reinstatement of Aristide. However, with the 
imposition of sanctions on Haiti, the junta changed its position and agreed to 
negotiate. Therefore, the Organisation of American States’ mediation attempt 
started as a consequence of the United States’ intervention.
During the dispute, there were some changes in the positions of the parties 
as a result of the first stage mediation, though they did not lead to an agreement in 
the end. For example Aristide, under the pressure of the United States, agreed to 
meet the military backed de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in 1992. Such a 
change in his position paved the way for the resumption of negotiations.
Another important change stemming from the first stage mediation was the 
signing of the Governor’s Island Agreement in July 1993. The junta was blocking 
important diplomatic activities which aimed to solve the dispute for a long time. In
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an effort to force the junta to come to the negotiation table, the United States called 
the United Nations to impose a worldwide arms and oil embargo over Haiti. As a 
result of these sanctions, the junta agreed to negotiate. During the negotiation, the 
junta had also agreed on a timetable for Aristide’s return under the pressure of the
United States. 50
The second stage mediation paved the way for important changes over the 
dispute. As an ongoing mechanism, transition to a democratic rule was secured. 
The democratically elected president was restored to power. In exchange for 
Aristide’s reinstatement, the military junta got amnesty including all military leaders 
involved in the coup. This transfer constituted an important position change for 
Aristide who was previously insisting on punishment or exile, let alone amnesty, for 
the coup leaders. Moreover, this exchange led to the redistribution of main 
resources, like power and amnesty. Aristide, reattained his power and the military 
junta saved their lives from being lynched with the help of amnesty. The agreement 
which was achieved as an outcome of the second stage mediation led to the 
international recognition of Aristide’s presidency and the cessation of hostilities 
which ruled throughout the process.
The following chapter presents the major findings derived from the three 
mediation cases.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
Based on the above analysis, the following is an account of the major findings. A 
summary of the findings is also presented in Table 1.
5.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
Regarding the power of the mediator in the Bosnian conflict the United States had 
two main sources of power: Its being a world power and its previous successful 
mediation attempt of 1994.
Similarly, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States’ status in the 
international arena following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War 
victory were its main sources of power.
For the Haitian conflict, in the first stage, the power of the mediator, that is 
of the United States, stemmed from being the superpower of the world. In the 
second stage, together with its being the superpower, confidential relations of its 
representative Carter with General Cedras and the ousted president Aristide in
addition to his credibility were sources of the mediator’s power.
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The primary stake of the United States about the Bosnian conflict was domestic 
which was related with the coming elections of November 1993. Its secondary 
concerns were to straighten the damaged prestige of the United States as a 
consequence of the downfall of the United Nations’ safe-havens and to try not to 
lose its influence in the region.
For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, all the concerns of the United States were 
primary. In this sense, its access to the Middle Eastern oil and its objective of 
securing stability with low cost in the region may be considered as the stakes of the 
mediator.
Like in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States’ concerns were all 
primary for the Haitian conflict. Its stakes were securing democracy in its backyard, 
eliminating the refugee problem and restoring its lost credibility during the conflict.
5.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
During the Bosnian conflict, the United States played several roles like manipulator 
while pioneering NATO air strikes and imposing deadlines on the Dayton talks. It 
was also a formulator in the sense of overcoming procedural difficulties and 
reducing outside pressure during the Dayton talks. The United States had also acted 
as a communicator among the parties during Assistant Secretary of State, Richard 
Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy.
5.2 ST A K E S O F TH E  M ED IA TO R
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During the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the United States had 
experienced two different administrations, the Bush Administration and the Clinton 
Administration, respectively. United States under the Bush administration acquired 
the role of manipulator in its above mentioned sticks policy against Israel’s 
settlement policy in the disputed territories, and in its negative attitude against the 
Israeli deportation policy within the United Nations Security Council. It also acted 
as a formulator by working on the perceptions of the parties and by reducing outside 
pressure during the Madrid process. Under the same administration, the United 
States had become a communicator through the United States Secretary of State, 
James Baker’s shuttle diplomacy between the parties.
United States under the Clinton administration was also a manipulator 
during its pressure forcing Arafat to crackdown on the terroristic activities against 
Israel. It acted as a formulator by presenting draft proposals on the Palestinian 
authority to the parties during the bilateral talks in the Madrid Process. During the 
Clinton Administration the United States was also a communicator between the 
parties for a time in the aftermath of the Hebron massacre of 1994.
During the Haitian conflict, in the first stage mediation attempt, the United 
States acted as a manipulator by imposing economic sanctions over the junta and 
moving the Organisation of American States to act along the same lines. Besides, it 
had become a formulator by presenting a proposal for the deployment of an 
international police force to assist transition to democracy in Haiti. In addition, the 
United States acquired the role of communicator through creating an indirect 
communication channel between the junta and Aristide.
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In the second stage, the United States acted as a manipulator with its military 
blockade around Haiti. Besides, Carter, as the representative of the United States, 
acted as a communicator by carrying the United States’ message of imminent 
invasion to Haiti. Carter had also acquired the role of formulator by convincing the 
junta that a United States invasion was imminent.
Concerning the neutrality of a mediator, the United States can not be 
accepted as neutral in neither case because of the fact that it had certain preferences 
concerning the resolution of these conflicts. For the Bosnian conflict, the United 
States’ preference was to secure a resolution that would punish the Bosnian Serbs. 
Concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States’ resolution to the 
conflict was not favouring a Palestinian state in the region. Another preference was 
its objection to the Israeli settlement policy in the disputed territories and to the 
redivision of Jerusalem. For the Haitian conflict, the United States preferred a 
resolution that would restore democracy in Haiti and end the refugee problem.
In the Bosnian conflict, regarding the impartiality of a mediator, the United 
States can not be accepted as an impartial mediator due to siding mostly with the 
Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs. Because it strengthened the positions 
of the Bosnian Muslims, threatened to launch renewed NATO air strikes if the 
Bosnian Serbs attacked the United Nations safe-havens despite the cease-fire 
agreement, and overlooked the Muslim-Croat offensive against the Bosnian Serbs in 
an effort to let the former get the upperhand.
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In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States under the Bush 
administration may be regarded as mostly impartial towards the parties. While 
pressuring Israel for its settlement policy over the disputed territories and criticising 
its deportation policy in 1992, the United States had also pressurised the 
Palestinians during the negotiations over the main rules of the Conference.
On the other hand, the United States under the Clinton administration can 
not be accepted as an impartial mediator as it acted mostly to Israel’s advantage. 
Preventing the imposition of sanctions against Israel by the United Nations Security 
Council in the aftermath of a deportation crisis in 1993 and blocking a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution criticising an Israeli settlement decision in East 
Jerusalem in 1997, may be cited as examples that demonstrate the partial policy of 
the United States under the Clinton administration.
During the Haitian conflict, the United States was not an impartial mediator 
either. The United States had mostly sided with the ousted President Aristide by 
imposing economic sanctions against Haiti under the rule of military junta, calling 
the United Nations to impose a worldwide oil and arms embargo over this 
Caribbean country and also threatened to invade it. The United States had 
sometimes pressurised Aristide as well, such as forcing him to grant amnesty to the 
military in 1993. Nevertheless, the United States can be regarded as mostly having 
sided with Aristide throughout the conflict. Likewise, during the second stage 
mediation, the United States can not be viewed as an impartial mediator as Carter 
was negotiating while a United States’ blockade was executed.
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In the Bosnian conflict, the timing of the mediator can be viewed as ripe due to the 
successful Croat offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and the parties’ need for a 
solution. The timely United States initiative, based on the notion of 51% - 49% v/as 
further strengthened with another timely intervention which was NATO air strikes.
For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the timing of the United States was 
definitely ripe as Soviet influence over the Middle East was drastically diminished 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union; the prestige of the United States was risen 
as a consequence of the Gulf War Alliance and the parties were in need of a 
resolution for this long-lasting dispute.
Regarding the Haitian conflict, the timing of the first stage mediation can be 
regarded as having been early. The negotiations which started off under pressure of 
sanctions pioneered by the United States, began early because the parties, 
particularly the junta, were not at the hurting stalemate situation. On the other hand, 
the timing of the second stage mediation was ripe. The parties were facing the 
hurting stalemate situation. The assets of the junta were frozen, a global embargo 
was imposed by the United Nations against Haiti. For Aristide, it had been three 
years since he was ousted.
5.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
For the Bosnian conflict, the entry of the mediator, the United States, can be viewed 
as having gained acceptance from the parties to the dispute. In the same way, the
5.4 T IM IN G  OF T H E M ED IA TO R
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entry of the United States to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was an invited one, and 
therefore was welcomed by the parties. On the other hand, the United States’ entry 
to the Haitian conflict at the first stage mediation can be regarded as having been 
imposed but, the second stage mediation gained the acceptance of both parties.
5.6 CHANGES REALISED
Regarding the Bosnian conflict, the mediator had firstly intensified the overt 
conflict via NATO air strikes and then tried to diminish the state of war by a cease­
fire agreement, and consequently achieved an end to the state of war with the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the overt conflict, intifada, which was 
present before the mediation attempt did not cease to exist with the beginning of the 
initiative, on the contrary it worked against the peace process. Therefore, the 
mediation attempt did not lead to a change in the state of overt conflict.
In the Haitian conflict, oppression of the pro-Aristide people by the military 
had already been present when the first stage mediation began. As time went by, this 
oppression turned out to be an overt conflict and resulted in a joint United Nations- 
Organisation of American States observer mission in Haiti. However, such a change 
can not be regarded as a consequence of the first stage mediation but the product of 
inner dynamics of the conflict, itself On the other hand, the second stage mediation 
can be viewed as having put an end to overt conflict.
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Regarding the Bosnian conflict, the relative power of the weak side, the 
Muslim-Croat side, was increased through realising NATO air strikes, supporting 
their arguments and offering to arm and train the Federation following the Dayton 
Agreement by the mediator. The mediator had sometimes increased the power of the 
Bosnian Serbs as well, like agreeing to give them the name of Republika Srpska. 
However, the United States can be regarded as having increased the relative power 
of the Muslim-Croat side throughout the process.
For the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the relative power of the weak side, the 
Palestinians against the Israelis was increased under the Bush administration. The 
mediator empowered the Palestinians through inviting them to an international 
conference, criticising Israel’s settlement and deportation policies. The United 
States under the Bush administration had sometimes empowered the Israelis as well, 
such as supplying jets and missiles and helping for the repeal of the United Nations 
clause equating Zionism with racism. However, the Bush administration can be 
viewed as having created a favourable setting for the Palestinians when compared 
with the Clinton administration.
Under the Clinton administration, the relative power of the Israelis against 
the Palestinians increased. The mediator strengthened Israel through its support 
within the United Nations Security Council during the deportation crisis of 1993, 
the land expropriation crisis of 1995, the tunnel crisis of 1996 and the settlement 
crisis of 1997. The administration increased the relative power of the Palestinians 
by attending to a conference organised by Arafat to which Israel was not invited in 
1997.
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Regarding the Haitian conflict, the power balance changed to the advantage 
of the weaker side, the ousted president Aristide, during the first stage mediation. 
The United States empowered him by not recognising the junta, suspending 
economic aid to Haiti, pioneering an Organisation of American States embargo and 
a United Nations oil and trade embargo against Haiti and freezing assets of the junta 
within the United States. The mediator had sometimes empowered the junta as well, 
like pressuring Aristide to grant amnesty to the coup leaders and considering the 
realisation of alternative proposals prepared by an anti-Aristide committee. 
However, the United States can be regarded as having increased the relative 
power of Aristide against the junta during the mediation attempt.
During the second stage mediation, the relative power of the junta 
increased as opposed to the first stage mediation. Carter, as representative of the 
United States, empowered General Cedras, ruling out the accusations that Cedras 
was a dictator and enabling the general’s “honourable retirement”. However, the 
existence of a military blockade around Haiti empowered Aristide against the junta 
during the second stage as well.
As an outcome of the United States’ mediation in Bosnia, territory, Sarajevo 
in particular, was redistributed in exchange for lifting economic sanctions over 
Yugoslavia. In an effort to reach an agreement, the mediator had also offered 
resources to the Muslim-Croat side, such as $ 600 million for the reconstruction of 
Bosnia and 20.000 ground troops for the enforcement of peace during the mediation 
process.
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During the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the mediator offered certain resources 
to the parties, ranging from tangible to intangible, in an effort to move the initiative. 
Under the Bush administration, the Palestinians achieved international recognition 
with convening of the Madrid Conference. Moreover, they started to receive 
financial capital through a donor conference organised by the United States. On the 
other hand, the Israelis received United States’ support in repealing the United 
Nations article equating Zionism with racism. Besides, the mediator had provided 
jets and missiles to the Israelis.
Under the Clinton administration, the Palestinians gained a preferential trade 
agreement with the United States while the Israelis received advanced technology 
against terrorism and the clear support of the mediator within the United Nations 
Security Council.
In addition to these changes realised during the process, land was 
redistributed as part of the initiative. Under the Clinton administration, the 
Palestinians received the right of implementation of Palestinian self rule over the 
Gaza Strip and various cities of the West Bank.
As for the Haitian Conflict, in the first stage, the mediator offered certain 
resources, such as granting amnesty, $ 50 million in nonlethal military aid and $ 1 
billion grant over five years to the Haitian military, in an effort to stir change in the 
rigid position of the junta. As a result of the second stage mediation, certain 
resources were redistributed such as power to Aristide and amnesty to the coup 
leaders.
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At the end of the mediation in Bosnia, certain position changes were 
realised. Both parties agreed on one another’s right of existence. The Bosnian Serbs 
dropped their secession demand. In exchange, the Bosnian Muslims recognised the 
Republika Srpska as a separate entity inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian 
Muslims accepted the notion of forming “special parallel relations” with the 
neighbouring states if such actions did not harm the sovereignty of Bosnia. Besides, 
the Bosnian Serbs accepted the removal of the President of the Serbian leadership, 
Radovan Karadzic, and the General of Bosnian, Army Ratko Mladic, from power.
During the Palestinian-lsraeli peace process, the parties had displayed 
certain policy changes. Both sides recognised each other with the signing of the 
Oslo Accord of 1993. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation ruled out its 
determination to destroy the State of Israel while the Israelis agreed to withdraw 
militarily from certain cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
As an outcome of the first stage mediation in the Haitian conflict, certain 
position changes of the parties were realised. For example, the junta agreed to start 
negotiating over Aristide’s reinstatement and Aristide accepted to meet with the 
military backed de-facto prime minister Marc Bazin in 1992. The second stage 
mediation had produced important position changes. Aristide agreed to grant 
amnesty to the coup leaders and the Junta accepted Aristide’s reinstatement.
In the Bosnian conflict, intervention of the mediator, accomplishment of 
NATO air strikes and the imposition of a deadline to the Dayton talks in particular.
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had accelerated the process. Therefore this can be regarded as having shortened the 
duration of the conflict.
As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States enabled the process 
move at times when it might halt, like it was the case during the tunnel crisis of 
1996 and the Hebron deal of 1997.
Regarding the Haitian conflict, the first stage mediation can be regarded as 
having prolonged the conflict through pressure over Aristide that encouraged the 
junta and the ineffective and arbitrary economic sanctions against Haiti. On the 
other hand, the second stage mediation can be viewed as having shortened the 
duration of the conflict as it impeded a very near invasion by the United States of 
Haiti.
Regarding the Bosnian conflict, the United States had also used the media 
in achieving change in the power balance in favour of the Bosnian Muslims by 
providing evidence in displaying the crimes of the Bosnian Serbs just before the 
beginning of the Dayton talks.
With the begirming of the United States’ initiative concerning the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a global awareness related to the conflict has emerged 
due to the media attention diverted to the peace process.
As the Haitian conflict did not receive worldwide public attention, no 
changes can be cited as a product of media attention.
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As a consequence of the mediation attempt in Bosnia, new ongoing 
mechanisms like the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina State, the 
deployment of Implementation Forces (IFOR) were achieved.
The United States’ initiative for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has produced 
certain ongoing mechanisms such as, the Palestinian National Authority, a donor 
conference for the Palestinians, an anti-terrorism periodical summit starting in 
Sharm el-Shaikh and a joint committee between the Palestinian National Authority 
and the United States to deal with political and economic issues
While there was no ongoing mechanism established as a result of the first 
stage mediation, the second stage mediation produced the revitalization of 
democracy as an ongoing mechanism in Haiti.
The coming chapter is the conclusion chapter which presents the 
comparisons of these three cases.
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Table 1. A Summary o f the Findings
CASES
Bosnian Conflict Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Haitian Conflict
Bush Adm. Clinton Adm. 1st Stage Ilnd Stage
Po 
the I
wer o f  
nediator
• Superpower
• Previous Attempt
• Superpower
• Economic power
• Superpower
• Economic power • Superpower
• Superpower
• Confidential 
relations and 
credibility o f the 
representative
Stakes 
o f the 
mediator
Primary
• Domestic concerns
• Oil
•  Low cost stability in the 
Middle East
•  Oil
•  Low cost stability in the 
Middle East
•  Democracy
•  Refugee crisis
• Credibility concerns
• Democracy
• Refugee crisis
• Credibility concerns
Secondary • Regional power 
concerns
- - - -
Roles 
o f the 
mediator
Manipulator
• NATO air strikes
• Deadlines during the 
Dayton Talks
• Anti-Settlements policy
• Anti-Deportations policy
• Pressure against Islamic 
terrorism
• Supports Peres against 
Netanyahu
• Economic sanctions
• UN oil and trade 
embargo
• Military blockade
Formulator • Technical problems 
solver
• Technical problems solver
• Worked over perceptions
• Worked on perceptions • Worked on 
perceptions
• Worked on 
perceptions
Communicator • Shuttle diplomacy • Shuttle diplomacy
• Revitalized 
communication
• Created 
communication
• Created 
communication
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Table 1. Continued
CASES
Bosnian Conflict Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Haitian Conflict
Bush Adm. Clinton Adm. 1st Stase Und Staee
Neutrality • Not Neutral • Not Neutral • Not Neutral
-----------------------------
•  Not Neutral • Not Neutral
Impartiality • Pro-Muslim Croat • Balanced • Pro-Israeli •  Pro-Aristide • Pro-Aristide
Timing o f the mediator •  Ripe • Ripe • Ripe • Early • Ripe
Entry o f the mediator • Accepted • Invited • Invited • Imposed • Accepted
Changes
realized
Overt Conflict • Ended • Continued • Continued • Increased • Ended
Relative Power • An increase in the 
Muslim-Croat side
• An increase in the 
Palestinian side
• An increase in the Israeli 
side
• An increase in 
Aristide’s
• An increase in 
Aristide’s
Redistribution 
o f resources
• Territory
• Lifting o f  economic 
sanctions
- • Territory -
• Power
• Amnesty
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Table 1. Continued
CASES
Bosnian Conflict Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Haitian Conflict
Bush Adm. Clinton Adm. 1st Stage Ilnd Stage
Changes
realized
Policy/
position
changes
B. Muslims B.Serbs
• Recognition · N o secession
• Special ·  N o power to 
parallel Karadzic and 
relations with Mladic 
neighbours
-
Palestinians Israel
• Recognition · Recognition
• No destruction · Withdrawal 
o f  Israel o f Israeli
troops
Junta Aristide 
• Started · Met 
negotiating Bazin
Junta Aristide 
• Accepted the · Gave 
reinstatement amnesty
Duration 
o f the conflict
• Shortened •  No change •  Enabled the process move • Prolonged • Shortened
Establishment 
o f ongoing 
mechanisms
• The State o f  Bosnia-Herzegovina
• IFOR
-
• PNA
• Anti-terrorism summit
• A joint committee between the 
USA and the PNA
• A financial capital channel
-
• Democracy
The use o f  
media
• Changed the power balance in 
favour o f the Muslim-Croat side
• Brought a global 
awareness about 
the conflict
• Brought a global awareness 
about the conflict - -
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole 
superpower in the international arena. The United States utilised “mediation” as a 
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, in an effort to 
secure its interests. For this purpose, the United States has employed various kinds 
of sources available, such as threatening to use or exerting brute force, imposing 
embargoes, working on the perceptions of the parties, solving technical problems of 
the process and creating communication between the parties.
As it can be observed throughout this study, this mechanism was used by the 
United States and served its purpose in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, in the second stage of Haitian conflict, except in the first stage mediation of 
Haitian conflict.
In this context, a general observation can be derived from the analyses which 
is the fact that the United States has been utilising muscle mediation' as one of its 
foreign policy tools in the Post Cold-War era.
Another conclusion can be derived from the mediation attempt executed 
during the Haitian conflict. As it can be observed in the analyses, neither the
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mediation of Organisation of American States nor of the United Nations could be 
realised without the influential activities of the sole superpower, the United States.
Although the Organisation of American States and then the United Nations 
seemed as the visible mediators, in fact, the United States was the real but concealed 
mediator during the first stage mediation attempt. Therefore, it would not be wrong 
to argue that, a mediation attempt can either be direct as it was the case in the 
Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the second stage mediation of the 
Haitian conflict or indirect as it was the case in the first stage mediation of the 
Haitian conflict. It is imperative to state that there is no such difference cited in the 
literature on mediation.
In direct mediation, the mediator itself initiates the process, sends its 
representative to the parties. The visible mediator and the real mediator stand as the 
same entity. However, in indirect mediation, the real mediator is not the visible 
mediator. The real mediator stands as the driving force behind the mediation 
attempt undertaken by the visible mediator.
Within this context, stemming from the fact that the United States has been 
an influential member of the Organisation of American States and the United 
Nations, it could influence the initiation of the Organisation of American States and 
the United Nations mediation in the Haitian conflict. Here, the visible mediators 
were the Organisation of American States and the United Nations but the real 
mediator was the United States. By this way, the United States had undertaken 
indirect mediation during the first stage of the Haitian conflict.
Another general conclusion is the fact that mediation is one of the important 
tools of international relations because in all the cases studied here, it is seen that 
mediation attempts led to certain changes in the eonflict systems. During or as an
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outcome of the mediation attempt, a change in the power balance between the 
parties, a redistribution of resources, changes in policy or positions of the parties, an 
extension or shortening in the duration of the conflict, the establishment of ongoing 
mechanisms can be realised.
Another interesting finding is regarding the interests of the mediator. When 
Table 1 is observed, it is seen that the United States had certain stakes in the 
Bosnian case, in Palestinian-Israeli case and in Haitian case. It had certain 
preferences related to the resolution of these conflicts. The United States intervened 
as a mediator in order to secure its interests. For this reason, theoretically it can not 
be accepted as neutral. Within this context, we can conclude that a mediator who 
has stakes can not be accepted as a neutral mediator.
A detailed analytical comparison of the findings gives us a fine grained 
picture of the mediation attempts conducted by the United States. For that purpose, 
first of all, a comparison is made between the United States mediation in the 
Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the second stage mediation attempt in 
Haitian conflict and the first stage mediation in the Haitian conflict. The main 
reason behind this selection is that the Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and the second stage mediation in the Haitian conflict ended up with agreements, 
whereas the first stage mediation in Haitian conflict did not.^ Therefore, in effort to 
understand why the first stage mediation of the Haitian conflict could not succeed in 
reaching an agreement while the mediation in the Bosnian, Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and the second stage mediation of the Haitian conflict succeeded, the first 
stage mediation of Haitian conflict can be used as a control group in deriving 
conclusions.
82
In each one of these four mediation attempts (See Table 1) the United States 
attained certain power; pursued certain stakes; manipulated the conflict; worked on 
perceptions of the parties and was not neutral. Three variables, namely impartiality, 
timing of the mediator and entry of the mediator demonstrate diversities when these 
four mediation attempts are compared.
When Table 1 is observed, it is seen that the mediator pursued a partial 
policy during the Bosnian conflict, Palestinian-Israeli conflict under the Clinton 
administration, in the second stage of Haitian conflict and then reached agreement. 
On the other hand, the mediator also pursued a partial policy during the first stage 
mediation of the Haitian conflict, but could not reach an agreement. Therefore, such 
a diversity can not be used as a tool to derive an answer to the above question.
On the other hand, the imposed way of entry and early timing of the 
mediator stand as critical variables in terms of the outcome of the mediation and 
they help us to derive the answer to the question.
The way the mediator enters a conflict is an important variable for the 
outcome of the mediation. The acceptance or invitation of the mediator by the 
parties is definitely to the advantage of the mediation process, as it was the situation 
in the Bosnian case, Palestinian-Israeli case and the second stage mediation of the 
Haitian conflict. On the other hand, the mediator’s imposed way of entrance to the 
first stage of the Haitian conflict stood as an impediment against the smooth 
ongoing of the process.
Timing of the mediator is another important variable for the outcome of 
mediation. The precondition for the timing of the mediator is the existence of a
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hurting stalemate situation. In particular, parties’ need for a solution and any 
remarkable change in the external factors related to the conflict are the most 
important criteria for the determination of the hurting stalemate situation. When we 
look at the Bosnian, Palestinian-lsraeli conflicts and the second stage mediation of 
the Haitian conflict, it is seen that both criteria are realised. On the other hand, in 
the Haitian conflict these criteria are not met. Neither Aristide nor the junta was 
suffering from the state of affairs at the time mediation started. Parties were not in 
an exhausting need to find a solution to the conflict. Besides, there was no 
remarkable change in the external factors that would press the parties to make 
concessions. Within this context, we can conclude that in the first stage mediation 
of the Haitian conflict the imposed way of entry and early timing of the mediator led 
to non-agreement.
A second comparison is made between the first stage and the second stage 
mediation of the Haitian conflict in order to understand the dynamics of this switch 
realised during the conflict. The first stage mediation which had an imposed entry 
and early timing did not produce an agreement despite increased manipulative 
tactics. As the United States became aware of the fact that its credibility was 
diminished in the eyes of the junta and the conflict was heading towards an overt 
confrontation, it started the second stage mediation by sending its representative. 
Carter, who had confidential relations with the junta. Therefore, the United States 
maneuvered from the first stage to the second stage mediation in an effort to break 
the deadlock for the resolution of the conflict.
This finding is important on the grounds that such an effective tactic which 
is used in real world conflicts is not cited in the theoretical literature on mediation.
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More research is needed to understand how widely this tactic is used in other similar 
cases.
A third comparison is made between the United States mediation in the 
Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in Haitian conflict stemming 
from the fact that they are clear examples of mediation attempts in which solid 
power has been utilised. In these three cases, the United States stood as the 
superpower, entered in the ripe moment, was an accepted or invited mediator, used 
manipulative tactics, worked on perceptions of the parties, acted as a technical 
problem solver and a communicator and was not neutral. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the United States demonstrated, in these three cases a typical muscle 
mediation by using all the power in its hand and in each case these muscle 
mediations resulted in agreements.
This finding has implications for the theoretical debate regarding the role of 
power in mediation attempts. Based on the above findings, it can be stated that 
“power” is an important component of international mediation.
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Notes for Chapter VI
' A kind of mediation in which power is used in all cases.
The Bosnian conflict and the second stage mediation of Haitian conflict ended up 
with a peace agreement. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been continuing with 
the agreements of Oslo Accord (1993), the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Areas (1994), the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip (1995) and Hebron Agreement (1997).
 ^ Some scholars, such as Touval and Zartman advocate that the role of power is an 
important component of mediation attempts. On the other hand, some others such 
as Burton advocate power-free third party interventions.
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